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Abstract 
 
With urbanization on the rise, policymakers cannot ignore urban conflicts. In the 
aftermath of the Cold War, several scholars were of the opinion that primitive modes of 
fighting, such as close combat, would cease to be used. However, as urban spaces have 
increasingly become battlefields in the 21st century, there has been a retrogression to a 
brutal and bloody mode of fighting. This return of primitivism affects the tactics that the 
military can use in urban warfare, which makes it a daunting strategic challenge. A 
combined focus on policy, strategy, and operations is necessary to improve thinking 
about how exactly to engage in urban warfare. Since this is a low-tech military problem, 
high-tech advances do not provide viable solutions. Israel’s Operation Protective Edge 
and the joint Iraqi and American fight for eastern Mosul are assessed in this thesis in their 
policy, strategy, and operational dimensions. Finally, I present conclusions and 
recommendations suggesting that we concentrate on honing our capabilities and 
knowledge in order to successfully engage in urban warfare while staying true to liberal 
democratic values. Such an approach will provide policymakers with more strategic 
options for dealing with urban warfare.   
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Strategic Studies and Urban Warfare 
 
“You may not be interested in war but war is interested in you.” – Leon Trotsky 
“…an urbanizing world means combat in cities, whether we like it or not.” – Ralph 
Peters1 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, there have been three major trends that have and 
will continue to shape the future of security policymaking. These trends are the 
increasing volatility between states in the international system (the rise of multi-polarity), 
the rise of violent non – state actors, and the urbanization of most of the world’s 
population. This thesis deals with the latter two topics. The rise of urban warfare has led 
to a resurgence of primitivism in military affairs. Since the large maneuver battles that 
were waged in World War Two, to the open battlefields of the Arab-Israeli War, and the 
First Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm), the rise of non-state actors and hybrid conflicts 
has thrown military affairs back from high-tech dependent warfare to ground warfare that 
is highly dependent on infantry tactics. Urban warfare is a low-tech problem that detracts 
from the technological developments that have been made over the past six decades in the 
areas of nuclear missile capabilities, improved communications technology, and advances 
                                                
1 Ralph Peters, “Our Soldiers, Their Cities,” PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly, no. 
Spring 1996 (1996): 43–50. 
 2 
in tank technology. High-tech advances unfortunately do not guarantee victory in urban 
warfare. Hence, they decrease the number of military options that policymakers can 
authorize.  
Furthermore, there seems to be an interesting parallel between the character of 
current conflicts and autocratic regimes. As primitive models of governance reemerge, 
we observe a return of primitive and brutal military modes of conflict. Rather than 
making technology ever more important in warfare, urban conflict results in militaries 
having to place more importance on ground combat troops. This makes Close Quarters 
Battle (CQB) important to the infantry again because even full political commitment 
cannot prevent the physically and mentally exhausting fighting that breaks out in urban 
warfare.  
As urbanization is becoming more prevalent around the world, the willingness of 
non – state groups – whether criminal gangs or terrorist organizations – to operate in 
these expanding urban areas has become evident. To understand how to engage with the 
way these non-state groups function is essential in bringing them to fall, hence one must 
study how to plan and conduct urban warfare. This is an incredibly difficult task because 
there is a disconnect in the way that strategy has been formulated, focusing hitherto on 
open battlefields. Over the past millennium and even the past centuries, strategists have 
advised against fighting in cities.  
S.L.A Marshall already remarked in the 1960s that while the battles with the 
highest casualty and attrition rates in the Second World War, the Korean War, and the 
Vietnam War were in urban areas, the topic has not been subjected to formal study, with 
 3 
no classic strategist covering the topic of urban warfare.2 The advice that Sun Tzu, 
Clausewitz, and others such as Jomini give is to avoid the extremely brutal and bloody 
fighting that breaks out in urban warfare.3 Yet, as David Kilcullen states, urbanization no 
longer lets us avoid urban areas as battlefields anymore. We must “drag ourselves – body 
and mind – out of the mountains.4 This thesis argues that the nexus between policy, 
strategy, and operations must be clearly defined in order to enable success in urban 
warfare operations.  
I examine the classic strategic texts of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz in detail to 
highlight some key concepts that apply on any battlefield. These elements are discussed 
in relation to strategy, operations, and urban warfare. As combat in cities could not be 
avoided in the past, it seems unlikely that this will also be the case in the future. 
Diplomacy, conflict resolution, and mediation efforts should by no means be discredited, 
but it is clear that not every hostile actor can be reasoned with.5 Understanding how to 
approach the political and military headache that urban warfare poses is important for 
these reasons. Policy goals, strategy, operations, and the use of tactics are re-examined 
here to show how these elements are interwoven. The works of Hew Strachan and 
                                                
2 S. L. A. Marshall, Notes on Urban Warfare (DTIC Document, 1973), 3, accessed February 16, 
2017, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=AD0758841. 
3 Ibid. 
4 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 262. 
5 The current situation with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a stark and unnerving 
example of this. ISIL is the Obama administration’s official designation. Others refer to them as the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In this thesis, the latter abbreviation can be found in the list of abbreviations, 
certain footnotes, and the bibliography. 
 4 
Edward Luttwak are also discussed as part of this assessment. These modern-day 
academics make it clearer as to why it is so difficult to talk about policy, strategy, 
operations, and tactics.  
The texts of Lin Biao, Mao Zedong, Giáp, Che Guevara, and Carlos Marighella 
are reviewed to show how guerrilla fighters view the use of tactics and warfare in their 
quest to achieve political goals. These texts inform us about the necessity of 
understanding the role of warfare when pursuing political goals. The extent to which 
these authors’ views are applicable to urban warfare is assessed. 
I then turn to more contemporary writers such as Kilcullen and Petraeus to 
examine the difficulties that policymakers and military troops face in urban warfare. This 
is exacerbated by the fact that waging war is already a difficult political undertaking for 
democracies.6 This only becomes more complex when dealing with urban warfare in the 
context of densely populated urban environments. These policy and strategy issues, and 
the importance of tactical innovation are discussed in the case studies in this thesis. The 
Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) Operation Protective Edge and the first phase in the fight to 
retake East Mosul are analyzed to understand how the issues regarding the conduct of 
urban operation and the use of tactics in the context of political goals are dealt with.  
Much of the literature concerning urban warfare has been written and compiled by 
military officers. These sources are used here to help create an understanding of the 
issues that the military has identified as major issues in urban warfare. The issues range 
                                                
6 For the challenges democracies face when engaging in urban warfare see, Henrik Bering, “Two 
Battles at Once: Democracies and Urban Warfare,” Policy Review, no. 157 (2009): 47–60. 
 5 
from training and skills enhancement, over cultural literacy, to the technical aspects of 
urban combat, and the need to generate actionable intelligence as quickly as possible.  
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Chapter 1: Policy, Strategy, and Operations 
 
Historical Texts: Clausewitz and Sun Tzu 
 
The classical strategists Clausewitz and Sun Tzu warned of fighting in urban 
areas. The rate of attrition is very high which leads to militaries paying a very high price 
through high casualty rates and loss of material when conducting urban warfare.7 Rather 
than focusing on these segments of their texts, we should remember their teachings about 
the centers of gravity, friction, the use of battle, and the importance of terrain. Cities 
should be viewed as centers of gravity where social, political, and military interactions 
are heavily intertwined. Unlike the open battlefields in Europe that were well suited for 
maneuver battles during the Second World War, the fighting force cannot be easily 
separated from the civilians who live in the city in which the fight is carried out. Thus, 
friction and the fog of war are more prominent in urban warfare than in the large-scale 
battles of World War Two. Imperfect information complicates this even further.8 
 These factors affect how strategy is formulated. Since the end of the Second 
World War, however, many factors that affect the formulation of strategy have been 
                                                
7 Marshall, Notes on Urban Warfare, 2. 
8 For a detailed discussion of an intelligence analysis methodology for urban operational 
environments see, Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum, Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in 
Complex Environments (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2009). 
 7 
misconstrued. These issues are discussed and explained in the following three sections to 
show how we can garner an understanding of why this misinterpretation occurred, and 
how to avoid it in the future.   
 8 
Problems of Modern Strategic Theory 
 
Modern strategic theory has become detached from the original (Clausewitzian) 
meaning of strategy. Many false labels have been assigned to strategy, and have put the 
idea in many people’s heads that strategy is a plan. To correct this, I deconstruct the 
meaning and relationship of policy to strategy and operations. Delineating these terms 
allows one to study the relationship between policy, strategy, and operations, which in 
turn has implications for policymakers and military professionals. I argue that strategy is 
merely the mission statement that a government or organization issues before going on to 
plan how to achieve these set goals. There are two seminal points to this chapter. First, 
strategy is not policy. Strategy distinguishes itself from the latter by not being subject to 
the political process; strategy is guided by policy.9 Second, strategy is the framework 
from which one draws up operations and contingency plans. Strategic goals influence 
which actions to take.10 
Chapter 1 focuses on the importance of strategy for military operations but 
acknowledges that a strategy can include a wide range of actions. A strategy, for 
example, can have a range of options ranging from economic sanctions over diplomatic 
negotiations, to the use of military power in the form of Special Forces raids, or a pre-
emptive nuclear first strike. Strategy is only a framework that guides how one should 
employ resources in order to achieve policy goals. The complexity surrounding strategy 
                                                
9 For a rational-choice based approach to strategy see Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” 
International Security 25, no. 2 (October 1, 2000): 5–50. 
10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning (Washington, D.C.: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 1, accessed March 25, 2017, 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA562213. 
 9 
arises from the difficulty of planning and successfully conducting operations using tactics 
to achieve policy goals. Focusing on how operations and tactics are connected to strategy 
is the best way to study the use of strategy for attaining policy goals.  
 
Terms got Muddled, so What? 
 
Misconstruing policy, strategy, and operations has implications for understanding 
how practitioners formulate the three. Conflating these terms only destroys their 
usefulness. It does not make the distinctions clear and mistakenly equates political goal-
setting (policy) with the ways of achieving these (operations). Hence, strategy has 
increasingly become a mixture of these two and no longer functions as a framework, but 
as an overly ambitious planning tool. Hew Strachan explains that it is currently 
fashionable, “to use the word strategy as a synonym for policy.”11 However, this is not 
strategy but a combination of using the word “strategy” as a synonym for policy and, at 
the same time, wanting this policy to function as an operations planning blueprint.  
Understanding how the development of the nexus of policy, strategy, and 
operations has distorted the meaning of strategy makes it clear as to why strategic 
thinking has become so very difficult. In relation to urban warfare, these issues affect the 
ways that policymakers can influence how a strategy is put into action by conducting 
operations. To deal with this in a more structured manner, the following two pages are 
used to explain these interrelations between policy, strategy, and operations. First, 
definitions for policy, strategy, operations, and tactics are provided. Then the relationship 
                                                
11 Sir Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 151. 
 10 
between them is illustrated through a flow chart. These two pages should clarify how 
these factors are related.   
 11 
The Three Levels of Policy, Strategy, and Operations 
 
Policy: Policymakers put their ideas into action by crafting and implementing 
policy.  A policy is commonly described as a set of goals a government, political party, or 
a business wish to achieve. In the case of businesses, policy goals are stated in a 
company’s mission statement. There can only be one strategy for every policy. A strategy 
tends to require many operations to be conducted for these goals to be achieved.  
Strategy: I define strategy as a framework that allows leaders to achieve policy 
goals through the means of operational conduct. Strategy brings policy goals to fruition. 
For example, a non-interventionist foreign policy emphasizes the use of diplomatic and 
economic power over the use of military force. As a framework, it informs the ways in 
which operations are planned and executed. 
The Operational Level and Operations: Operational design, operational and 
contingency planning, and operational art all fall under the operational level of war. 
Operations require the use of tactics to conduct operations. The degree of success is 
dependent upon a commander’s aptitude for operational art. Successfully conducting 
operations directly helps in achieving strategic and policy goals. 
Tactics: Borrowing from Clausewitz, I define tactics as “the arrangement and 
conduct of combat.”12 Tactics are the tools that are used to conduct operations and reach 
strategic objectives. They are employed to conduct operations and achieve strategic 
goals. A strategy cannot be brought to fruition without tactics. Using tactics without 
                                                
12 Sun-Tzu and Karl von Clausewitz, The Book of War: Sun-Tzu’s “The Art of War” & Karl Von 
Clausewitz’s “On War,” First Edition. (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 329. 
 12 
having a strategic goal will most likely not lead to victory because one cannot reach an 
end state that has not been defined.   
 13 
Figure 1. – The Relationship between Policy, Strategy, Operations, and Tactics 
 
 
 
Note: The relation between the ROE (rules of engagement), the role of policymakers, and 
tactics is discussed in more detail in chapter 2.  
 14 
Delineating Strategy from Policy 
 
 Since the Cold War, people tend to see strategy and policy as one instead of two 
separate entities.13 Along these lines, Strachan argues that the meaning of strategy has 
been lost. He argues that the German word Politik, which can mean either politics or 
policy, has been falsely translated.14 The process through which policy goals are selected 
is inherently political. Thus, this is the main cause for the confusion. 
 The meanings of these concepts are so blurred that many scholars and 
practitioners no longer consider the differences between the terms policy, strategy, and 
operations.15 While Strachan argues that strategy is how military leaders seek to achieve 
policy goals, I argue that strategy is the goal or goals that a policy wishes to achieve, and 
that these goals are attainable through military operations or other non-kinetic actions 
such as economic sanctions or de-radicalization programs.16 Strategy, per Clausewitz, 
outlines how policy goals are going to be achieved. Thus, we must bear in mind that the 
actions mentioned above are not strategies but tactics. Since the world has misinterpreted 
what strategy stands for, the challenge is to stop thinking about tactics as strategies.17 
                                                
13 Ibid., 211–212. 
14 Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” Survival 47, no. 3 (October 1, 2005): 33–36. 
15 Strachan, The Direction of War, 215. 
16 Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” 52. 
17 “Why a Strategy Is Not a Plan,” The Economist, last modified October 2, 2013, accessed May 
15, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21588834-strategies-too-often-fail-because-
more-expected-them-they-can-deliver-why. 
 15 
 As the meaning of strategy is “the use of the engagement for the purpose of the 
war,”18 and since policy directly affects the formulation of strategy, strategy must be 
understood as a guiding script for planning operations and not as an inflexible planning 
document. As Strachan points out, the Clausewitzian definition of strategy does not 
define policy. Clausewitz understood that strategy was not synonymous with policy or 
politics.19 At most, strategy should be considered a framework for the actions that will be 
undertaken to achieve the goals defined by policy. For a strategy to be successful, 
operation plans must be drawn up and implemented.  
As was discussed above, the academic study of war at the operational level has 
been very scarce. Even though Luttwak stated back in 1981 that, “It is not surprising that 
the major works of military literature tend to focus on the operational level, as evidenced 
by the writings of  
Clausewitz,”20 it seems that not much has changed since he published his article 
“On the Operational Level of War.” A simple Google search reveals that the majority of 
research related to the operational level of war, and operational design that is necessary to 
plan operations, is conducted and published by military practitioners.21In recent years, 
Hew Strachan, a military historian at Oxford University, has described the importance of 
                                                
18 Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” 34. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Edward N. Luttwak, “The Operational Level of War,” International Security 5, no. 3 (1980): 61. 
21 Googling “Operational Level of War” generates over a million hits but the first are mostly 
documents published by the military. For an example of a scholar-practitioner’s publication on operational 
design see Jeffrey M. Reilly, Operational Design: Distilling Clarity from Complexity for Decisive Action 
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2012). 
 16 
strategy and operations, and their relation to policy.22 With policy defining the goals that 
a strategy is to achieve, operational plans “need to look to the near term, and work with 
specific situations,” to ensure that policy objectives are achieved.23 
 Strategy exists at the intersection of policy and operations. The formulation of 
strategy then aims at connecting policy and operations. Freedman believes that the 
components of strategy should be flexible.24 For example, if we know that our policy 
objective is the implementation of democracy and that our strategy is the pacification of a 
country, then we can plan and execute operations accordingly. As a framework, strategy 
allows battlefield commanders to design operations plans. To achieve the goals outlined 
by policymakers, operational planners can use strategic (and policy) guidance to identify 
the resources necessary and determine the best course of action (COA) to meet these 
objectives.25  
 
Deconstructing False Labels: Strategy and Operations 
 
Nowadays, it seems that there is a strategy for everything and everyone. The 
United States has a national security strategy, a cybersecurity strategy, a space strategy, a 
strategy for countering violent extremism, an international development strategy, and 
                                                
22 Strachan, The Direction of War, 265. 
23 Hew Strachan, “Strategy and Contingency,” International Affairs 87, no. 6 (November 1, 2011): 
1281. 
24 “Why a Strategy Is Not a Plan.” 
25 Reilly, Operational Design, 21. 
 17 
businesses have so-called marketing and sales strategies.26 In fact, the U.S. Department of 
Defense and the civilian federal government agencies have different cybersecurity 
strategies.27 Standalone cyber and space strategies are useless concepts because they are 
not focused on framing a response to these problems. Rather, they are planning 
documents to reach those goals. As could be seen in the previous section, what we call 
strategy today is a misnomer because it includes too many operational and tactical details. 
In many cases, strategies do not link means to ends. Proposed actions however, are 
planning efforts and not strategies. 
Strachan retraces the historical development of strategy in Europe from the 18th 
century to the present day. He concludes that the most important factor for a successful 
strategy is the development of an operational concept that enables commanders to fulfill 
policy goals.28 This, in turn, requires the acknowledgement that the coordination of 
military operational capabilities needs to be credited for creating what is still called 
“strategic success.” For example, the Allies were only able to bring their overwhelming 
                                                
26 For the DoD’s cyber strategy see U.S. Department of Defense, “THE DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2015), accessed April 25, 2017, 
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-
strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf; For the National Security Space Strategy 
see U.S. Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “United States 
National Security Space Strategy (Unclassified Summary of January 2011)” (U.S. Department of Defense, 
2011), accessed May 20, 2017, http://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-
bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/zlw60&section=27; For the misinterpretation of marketing and sales 
plans as strategies see “Why a Strategy Is Not a Plan.” 
27 For the DoD see U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Cyber Strategy”; Shaun Donovan and 
Tony Scott, “Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP) for the Federal Civilian Government” 
(Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget, 2001), accessed October 30, 2015, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2016/m-16-04.pdf. 
28 Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, Revised ed. edition. (London; New 
York: Routledge, 1988), 207. 
 18 
power to bear in the Second World War because they coordinated the use of their 
operational capabilities. As Strachan explains: 
Neither the advocates of the bomber nor those of the tank had been proved right in 
the Second World War. The independent use of any one arm in the long run was 
inadequate. But in collaboration with each other and with infantry and artillery, 
both bomber and tank achieved much. Each arm, each service and each nation 
developed a specific approach. Those traits of independence did not become 
divisive and ultimately self-defeating because of the effectiveness of allied 
communications. From the major tripartite conferences, through the staff talks, 
down to wireless conversations on the battlefield itself, communications ensured 
coherence. Thus, the allies could attack on a broad front, allowing the full 
deployment of their economic superiority.29  
 
This demonstrates that one can create strategic success by employing operational 
capabilities and allocating resources more efficiently than one’s adversary. Success, 
therefore, depends heavily on operational planning. Standalone strategies are useless 
academic concepts because they are not focused on how to frame a response to these 
problems, but rather focus on how to plan a crisis response.30 Many of the different labels 
stem from the mislabeling of operations as strategies, such as theater strategy and 
specialized space, air, maritime, and cyber strategy. Nevertheless, these are all domains 
in which conflict is possible. To tackle these problems, different operational concepts and 
plans must be developed.  
In relation to operational and contingency planning, Strachan makes the point that 
emphasis should be placed on improving operational responsiveness to uncertainty and 
                                                
29 Ibid., 183. 
30 Luttwak refers to these kinds of single force strategies as “non-strategies,” see Edward N. 
Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised edition. (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1987), 
156. 
 19 
volatility in the international system.31 Both he and Luttwak argue that there are many 
components that affect operational planning and the operational level of war.32 As 
urbanization is on the rise, potential urban conflicts need to be taken into account when 
formulating a strategy. Having delineated policy from strategy, we now turn to the 
differences between strategy and operational art.  
 
Operational Art Misconstrued as Strategy 
 
The potential for arising future urban conflicts requires new operational concepts 
that enable joint operations. Operational art has, however, been ignored in favor of 
strategic studies. Since strategy has been mislabeled, it no longer matches its 
Clausewitzian meaning. Therefore, the bigger problem is a conceptual and philosophical 
one: we should stop labeling everything that is difficult to think about, and plan for, as a 
strategic challenge. These challenges are mostly related to military operational art. The 
conduct of operations is not the same as the formulation of a strategy or the operational 
planning process. Qualitative factors such as leadership, resiliency, discipline, and 
                                                
31 Strachan, “Strategy and Contingency,” 1281–1283; Furthermore, "A reassessment of the 
concept of balance of power is in order. In theory, the balance of power should be quite calculable; in 
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actions to an assessment that cannot be proved when it is made - is never made - is never more true than in 
a period of upheaval." See Henry Kissinger, World Order, 371 (UK: Allen Lane, 2014); See also Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, 110-120, 2nd edition. (New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 2012). 
32 On contingency planning see Strachan, “Strategy and Contingency”, 1287-1292; for strategy 
and the conduct of operations in war see Luttwak, “The Operational Level of War", 61. 
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motivation are decisive factors for the conduct of operations. They tend to be the driving 
forces that lead to victory in combat operations.33 
While commanders must retain the freedom to act independently, they must do so 
within the guidelines of a strategy. Allowing military commanders to make decisions 
independently is important for the success of a strategy. This command and control (C2) 
concept is called Mission Command and has its roots in the Prussian Army’s formulation 
of broadly defined order known as Auftragstaktik.34 
If policymakers exert too much control over the tactics being employed, the 
policy goals will not be reached. Strategy formulation and operational planning are 
necessary to achieve these goals. Whether one agrees with Bush’s political ideas or not, 
he did understand the importance of military planning.35 Counterinsurgency (COIN) in 
Iraq was only successful because military leaders with professional experience and the 
appropriate education were allowed to implement the operational concepts and plans that 
                                                
33 For leadership and resiliency see Thomas Bauer and Ralph Rotte, “Prospect Theory Goes to 
War: Loss-Aversion and the Duration of Military Combat” (1997), 17, accessed April 17, 2017, 
https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1489/; for discipline and motivation see Trevor N. Dupuy, Understanding 
War: History and Theory of Combat (New York: Paragon House, 1987), 87. 
34 For the definition of mission command as used by the U.S. Army see U.S. Department of the 
Army, ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2011), 6-7, 
accessed February 17, 2017, https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/info/references/ADP_3-
0_ULO_Oct_2011_APD.pdf; for the historical development of Auftragstaktik in the Prussian and German 
Army see Martin Sonnenberger, “Initiative Within the Philosophy of Auftragstaktik: Determining Factors 
of the Understanding of Initiative in the German Army, 1806-1955” (US Army Command and General 
Staff College, 2015), accessed February 25, 2017, 
http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/CSI/CSIPubs/Sonnenberger_Book.pdf. 
35 Nico Hines, “Senior UK Defense Advisor: Obama Is Clueless About ‘What He Wants To Do In 
The World,’” The Daily Beast, last modified January 15, 2014, accessed March 19, 2017, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/15/senior-uk-defense-advisor-obama-is-clueless-about-
what-he-wants-to-do-in-the-world.html. 
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they thought to be most effective.36 The ability of commanders to make operational 
decisions (Mission Command) directly affects the success or failure of a strategy. 
However, strategy can only be delivered on if it has been well defined as a framework 
that guides operational leaders to reach policy objectives. This shows that much of what 
has been labelled as strategy is in fact operational art.  
 
The Element of Strategy 
 
Having established that strategy is a framework and that operations are conducted 
to implement it, we now look at what makes a strategy successful. Instead of looking at 
how to improve operations planning and conduct, Colin S. Gray explains that there are 
seventeen important factors that make up a successful strategy.37 However, Gray makes a 
glaring mistake when studying strategy because he tries to systematize the issues relating 
to executing a strategy. Gray does not study operations in depth or clarify how important 
these are for strategy. In fact, he barely mentions operational capabilities. When Gray 
analyzes Clausewitz’s legacy for strategic studies, he writes that Clausewitz “laid bare 
the nature of war and strategy.”38 He goes on to state that Ludendorff, Hitler, Churchill 
and Stalin were the only figures of the twentieth century to hold both a certain amount of 
                                                
36 Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War, 
Reprint edition. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 303–305; John A. Nagl and Peter J. Schoomaker, 
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, 1st edition. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
37 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, 1 edition. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 24. 
38 ibid, 75.  
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political and military power that enabled them to enact their strategies the way they did.39 
However, while Gray goes on to point out that Marshal Zhukov, General Eisenhower, 
and General MacArthur were “all but dwarfed by their obvious subordination to political 
authority,”40 it must be noted that these military practitioners were the ones planning and 
conducting the necessary operations that brought about the success or failure of the 
strategy laid out by policymakers and military leaders.41  
Gray concludes that strategy is eternal and that the difficulty lies in its 
performance rather than its permanent nature or even its changing character.42 Here, I 
disagree with Gray’s interpretation of Clausewitzian strategic thought since, “strategy is 
the use of the engagement to attain the object of the war.”43 As such, strategy never 
changes in character; it remains a blueprint that informs planners about how they can 
connect means to ends. Hence, executing successful operations is the result of operations 
planning and operational conduct which must be based on a well-formulated strategy.  
 
Strategy and Operations Are Key to Policy Success 
 
As was briefly mentioned before, Strachan focuses on Clausewitz’s distinction 
between strategy and policy to show that they are not the same. This differentiation 
                                                
39 ibid, 77-78.  
40 ibid, 78.  
41 Military leadership in this case refers to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and organizations with 
similar tasks around the world.  
42 Gray, Modern Strategy, 354. 
43 Ibid. 
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allows for greater focus to be placed on the difficult task of planning. As Strachan makes 
abundantly clear, planning operations, drawing up contingency plans, and implementing 
them successfully is what determines the successful outcome of a strategy.44 In this view, 
strategy remains important because it enables practitioners to operationalize policy. By 
setting the bounds, it instructs operational planners on the availability of the resources 
they can commit to achieving the goals that have been set by policymakers. Thus, policy 
goals can only be brought to fruition if the relationship between strategy and planning is 
taken into consideration.  
When a strategy is drawn up it must allow for actions to be undertaken that can be 
adapted to changing situations. This level of flexibility is only attainable on the 
operational level if adjustments can be made by operational commanders and platoon 
leaders involved in tactical engagements.45 Only if operational-level commanders can 
adapt their battle plans to situational circumstances can they bring a strategy to fruition 
and achieve the goals set out by policymakers. We now turn to the importance of policy 
objectives and conducting operations to fulfill them. Operations are the complex 
amalgamation of tactical processes; however, the uncertainty created through the conduct 
of battles can cause unanticipated consequences. Uncertainty and friction can cause 
unwanted outcomes, even resulting in the failure of operations.  
  
                                                
44 Strachan, “Strategy and Contingency,” 1296. 
45 Luttwak, “The Operational Level of War,” 61; Strachan, The Direction of War, 212. 
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Policy Goals and the Conduct of Operations 
 
As was alluded to before, policy objectives manifest in operations. How 
operations are conducted determines the success or failure of strategy, and by extension, 
policy. Strategy merely guides the operations planning process and determines which end 
state should be achieved.46 As such, strategy is the framework for how operations are 
conducted; it is “the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war.”47  
In Book III: Of Strategy in General, Clausewitz covers the main elements of 
strategy that are necessary to achieve policy goals. Clausewitz explains that strategy only 
functions as a framework for reaching the goals that have been set out by policymakers. 
In Book VIII: Plan of a War, Clausewitz explains in great detail that planning is 
important for the conduct of war. Planning is a required activity for leading a successful 
campaign to achieve policy goals. A battlefield commander can increase his chances of 
mission success by developing different COAs (course of actions) and placing them into 
context with the operational environment’s conditions before he conducts an operation.  
According to Clausewitz, strategy is constructed to guide decision-makers in 
achieving goals set out in a policy. Strategic goals are how a policy is administered; 
operations are how to go about achieving those goals, and tactics are the tools that can be 
used to conduct these operations. Thus, strategy is a conceptual framework that is meant 
                                                
46 “Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 defines end state as ‘the set of required conditions that defines 
achievement of the commander’s objectives.’1 The gravity of employing the military instrument of power, 
however, mandates a clear understanding of strategic purpose bounded by a national strategic end state and 
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to inform operational planners and decision-makers about how they should go about 
conducting a campaign or specific operation. It is a framework that guides the planning 
and conduct of operations.48  
Only if operations are planned for, and contingency plans are drawn up, can a 
strategy be successful. Therefore, choices made about how to reach one’s strategic goal 
must have many smaller goals that must be reached on the operational level.49 What is 
now called the operational level of war was referred to by Clausewitz and Sun Tzu as 
engagements. To conduct operations successfully requires assessing the situation, putting 
it into context with one’s strategy, and planning engagements.  
 Whether constructing assessments, waging battle, or creating strategic advantage, 
Sun Tzu wrote that the tasks of planning and implementing operations are components 
with which one can achieve the goals set out in a policy.50 The creation of strategic 
advantage in particular is an area that depends entirely on the conduct of operations and 
not on strategic thought. Sun Tzu explains that: 
Generally in battle use the ‘straightforward’ to engage the enemy and the ‘surprise’ 
to win the victory. […] ‘Surprise’ and ‘straightforward’ operations give rise to each 
other endlessly just as a ring is without a beginning or an end. And who can exhaust 
their possibilities?51  
 
It can be seen that the range of operations yields endless possibilities for a 
commander. The conduct of operations determines, to a large extent, if a strategy will be 
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49 Luttwak, “The Operational Level of War,” 62–63. 
50 Sun-Tzu and Clausewitz, The Book of War, 73, 75, and 85. 
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successful or not. Thus, the level below strategy, i.e. the operational level, is where the 
success or failure of a strategy is determined.52  
Nonetheless, the outcome of military operations cannot be fully predicted because 
of the uncertainty that is created through the friction of fighting a combat engagement. 
This is what the Prussian Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke wished to express when he 
wrote that, “No plan survives contact with the enemy.”53 The fog of war creates 
uncertainty. Clausewitz outlined this in much detail and explained that uncertainty and 
friction can only be dealt with by continuously carrying out the actions of operational 
planning and practicing maneuvers.54 It is in this area of warfare that innovation has 
played a decisive role in advancing the ways in which maneuvers are used.38 Even 
nowadays, the presence of modern communications technologies on the battlefield has 
not been able to alleviate the battlefield commander from the uncertainty of war.55  
At a minimum, the uncertainty created by engagements in operations plays a part 
in deciding the outcome of a war. Understanding when to disengage an enemy, when to 
delay actions, and how to conduct combat under special conditions makes all the 
difference because these decisions directly influence the degree of friction generated by 
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combat. 56The only way to bypass the majority of problems is to plan operations and 
acknowledge that luck and uncertainty are important factors in warfare.  
The uncertainty and friction created by warfare heavily influence the outcome of 
tactical engagements which, in turn, has an impact on operations. Friction is created 
through the conduct of battle.57 The only way to deal with the issues that friction can 
cause is through ad hoc judgement decisions. The most prominent way of trying to 
counter uncertainty is through contingency planning. The military historical record 
suggests that these factors should be subjected to further study.58 This mitigates some risk 
and ensures that commanders are not caught totally off guard when unpredictable 
situations arise in battle.  
 
Resources, Strategy, and Operational Planning 
 
To make the conduct of operations possible, a military must be able to utilize its 
economy of force. David Stone observes that, “Von Seeckt was aware of the importance 
of economic factors in a war and took them into account while establishing the 
Wehrmacht.”59 For this reason, he tried to create the awareness for a rapidly expandable 
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industrial base to support combat efforts and the forward-deployed supply lines.60 
However, the Wehrmacht’s warfighting manual did not emphasize the importance of 
forward-deployed supply lines for combat forces.61  The failure to take operational 
capabilities into account when planning the initial campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq has 
reaffirmed their importance. The military industrial base is no longer geared towards 
operational capability development. It has become a large research and development 
effort in which companies from time to time succeed in manufacturing useful military 
equipment.45 Equipment, although not discussed in detail in this thesis, is a factor that 
directly influences a military’s ability to effectively conduct operations. The implications 
are so far-reaching that operational planning can be hindered through the acquisition 
process.62 The overall effectiveness of a strategy is heavily influenced by the resource 
constraints placed on operational planners. 
 
Strategy, the Conduct of Operations, and achieving Victory 
 
Achieving strategic goals requires that operations are conducted successfully. This 
depends on implementing tactics that do not negatively affect strategic outcomes. As 
Luttwak observes:  
In the imminence of possible death, the easiest action that entails increased exposures will 
remain undone unless all sorts of complex intangibles (morale, cohesion, and leadership 
among them) can overcome the instinct of survival. And once the centrality of these 
intangible mysteries is duly recognized in what happens and fails to happen, no simplicity 
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remains even in the most elementary of tactical actions conducted against a living, 
reacting enemy.63 
  
 This becomes an incredibly difficult task to achieve when one factors in the 
importance of facing not a static but reactive enemy. Uncertainty is the most important 
factor; it can only be overcome through decisive action. Both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz 
discuss uncertainty in tactical engagements. They conclude that planning and vigilance – 
what we have come to call situational awareness – are essential components of successful 
combat.50 To conduct combat that contributes successfully to strategic goals is of 
paramount importance, but this is an area that has not received much attention in past 
decades. 
In Fighting for the Fatherland, David Stone explains the importance of 
administrative reforms by looking at the military reforms undertaken by General Hans 
von Seeckt in the German Army between the two World Wars.64 In a more contemporary 
context, the U.S. Army started a similar process which led to the publication of a report 
on the future of the Army.65 In both cases, the reforms were meant to bring about the 
changes required to maintain operational capabilities. 
The strategic framework helps with the formulation of plans. Measuring whether a 
strategy is performing successfully is necessary, but evidence suggests that we are not 
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very good at this.66 Creating indicators that measure the effectiveness of tactics for a 
strategy are difficult to conceive, albeit necessary. 
The construct, concept, and indicators of strategy are the most important 
categories to understand when formulating a coherent strategy. Planning and conducting 
operations is of paramount importance for reaching the goals set out in policy. Successful 
operations indicate that a strategy is effective. A strategy, however, is only measurable if 
the measures of effectiveness can show if operational planning and conduct led to 
strategic goals being achieved. The indicators used for this need to be relatable to 
measures of effectiveness. For this reason, a strategy must be executable through 
operations, and should not be a statement of political aims.   
Even though it is well documented in classic strategic texts that a strategy needs 
indicators to measure its success, this has been covered very poorly in modern strategic 
literature.67 Gray argues that a strategy contains seventeen distinct variables, but these 
were meant to guide the formulation of a successful strategy. They do not suffice for 
planning how to achieve strategic goals.68  
 
Policy, Strategy, Operations Planning, and the Tactical Toolkit 
 
As was stated above, strategy provides guidance for accomplishing policy goals, 
rather than a specific plan of action. For this reason, operations need to be conducted to 
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achieve the goals that have been outlined. The success of a strategy is dependent upon the 
tactics that are employed when operations are conducted. Policy goals need to be defined 
before a strategic blueprint can be drawn up to guide the operations that need to be 
conducted. Strachan explains that over the course of the Cold War, tactical and 
operational considerations were given less attention than policy and strategic posture.69 
For this reason, the study of strategy, operations, and tactical actions are necessary to 
understand how to achieve policy goals. The use of hard power is but one tactical choice 
that can be made. Implementing economic sanctions or deploying troops are examples of 
this. Soft power tactics, such as conducting diplomatic negotiations or practicing civil 
engagement, can be used when appropriate.  
The tactical level has not received much attention by researchers.70 The lessons 
learned from tactical engagements need to be placed in the appropriate operations context 
because decisions made under the stressful conditions of combat are very subjective and 
difficult to study.  
Edward N. Luttwak suggests with his theory of the logic of strategy that the 
seemingly most inefficient option can be the strategically most effective choice.71 A 
perfect example of this is the inverse relationship of counterterrorism tactics and strategy. 
To decrease terrorism and an insurgency, a dual approach that combines the soft power 
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tactics of counterinsurgency (COIN) and hard power counterterrorism tactics and 
aggressive operations like raids is necessary.72 
Planning the operations that the strategy allows for and those that will be 
necessary to attain policy goals is a seemingly simple task that many people fail to 
perform. The tactics that can be employed need to be taken into consideration to see what 
options are available. Planners must ensure that the suggested methods can actually be 
employed. Hence, we should not forget that luck and uncertainty are factors that heavily 
influence the outcome of campaigns and operations. 
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Department of the Army, 2014), 9–4, accessed January 25, 2017, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-
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Chapter 1 Conclusion: The Role of Strategy 
 
As could be seen throughout this chapter, we must study policy, strategy, 
operations, and tactics together and not in isolation. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu’s texts are 
an excellent basis for studying the interrelation of policy goals, strategy formulation, 
operations planning, tactics and the effects of uncertainty, friction, and the fog of war on 
them.  
We should state again that policy is inherently political since its original meaning 
in German is politics.73 Strategy should be seen only as a framework for attaining policy 
goals. Formulating a strategy is not difficult; implementing and executing it successfully 
is. The complexity that operational planning and the tactical level entail need to be 
acknowledged. We must understand their implications. As complex as planning and 
conducting operations may be, they are necessary processes for achieving strategic 
objectives. In fact, drawing up a strategy and defining realistically attainable strategic 
objectives will become an ever most difficult task. With the security spectrum spanning 
from proliferation, over conventional warfare and insurgencies, to the outbreak of 
pandemics and humanitarian crises, this will not become any easier. 
With the shift from rural to urban battlefields, urban warfare must be looked at as 
a strategic challenge. A warfighter’s choice of tactics can affect the success of a strategy. 
The concept of the Strategic Corporal is an example of how practitioners have already 
started thinking about the importance of tactical decisions made by the common combat 
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soldier and Marine.74 This development is of immense importance for achieving policy 
goals and strategic objectives. Urbanization requires us to reexamine the classical 
strategic texts of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu and put them into the context of urban 
operating environments as urban areas are bound to become more important for 
policymakers. In future, strategy formulation will require us to study the implications, 
advantages, and repercussions tactics can have on achieving strategic objectives and 
policy goals. 
 
Having laid out these definitions, we now turn to the issue of how non-state actors 
and guerrillas view the importance of cities and urban warfare.   
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Guerrillas in Cities in the 1960s and 1970s 
 
In their fight against the so-called Establishment, guerrillas also took their 
struggle into cities. Due to their strategy of avoiding direct battles in open spaces, 
guerrillas mostly lived in the countryside and then conducted attacks in urban areas 
through skirmishes and hit-and-run attacks.  
Carlos Marighella was the only guerrilla who focused on fighting the 
Establishment in cities. As the most famous urban guerrilla, he applied the methods of 
guerrilla warfare in the cities of Brazil. Marighella outlines strategy, operational 
procedures, and also comments on the tactics that should be employed by urban guerrilla 
groups.  
Concerning politics and political ends, Marighella references Che Guevara as the 
main source of political inspiration and makes it clear that the main strategic objective of 
a guerrilla movement is to bring about political change.75 In light of the concentration of 
powerful people in cities, these should be where the revolution should be carried out. 
Marighella’s reason for conducting guerrilla operations in cities is, therefore, clear. This 
political goal is his reason for bringing the fight against the local Brazilian government 
and their American allies to the streets and houses of Brazilian cities. Marighella’s 
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importance lies in the fact that he is the only guerrilla of the 1960s and 70s to focus on 
the city as a strategically important area.  
Che Guevara does acknowledge that cities are important, but to him the 
countryside is more important.76 Guerrilla strategy, according to Che Guevara, requires a 
new and different approach. For him, the main issues are the underlying social and 
economic inequalities. The guerrilla movement must explain the importance of the 
revolution to the local population.77 These reasons are meant to motivate people to join a 
guerrilla movement. Guevara also has a completely different definition of strategy than 
Clausewitz. Guevara states that guerrillas should understand strategy as, “the analysis of 
the objectives to be achieved in the light of the total military situation and the overall 
ways of reaching these objectives.”78 While Guevara uses this different definition of 
strategy and believes that the countryside is more important than cities for a popular 
struggle, he gives important advice on the use of tactics. For him, mobility is the most 
important tactic for guerrillas.79 It can be used to successfully fight against government 
forces by executing a range of movements such as encirclement and attacking troops by 
night. As guerrillas are likely to be outnumbered by government forces, they must 
capitalize on the element of surprise whenever possible.80 Mobility and tactics are also 
useful for fighting in an urban combat environment.  
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Mao Zedong places more emphasis on the importance of ideology and politics 
than Che Guevara. Guerrillas mostly exploit the tactical advantages they are given. It also 
goes to show that Mao was aware of the importance of having a simple strategy, an issue 
that I address in chapter 1. Overly complicated strategic objectives only hamper one’s 
ability to reach the political goal. He argues that a commander should aim at exhausting 
the enemy in the long run.81 Referring to the Sino – Japanese War, Mao states that, “the 
War of Resistance will be a protracted war.”82 Further addressing the study of war and 
politics, Mao states that most people either have a mechanistic or idealistic approach, 
neither of which is helpful for devising a successful strategy.83 To beat a strong enemy, 
Mao highlights the importance of flexibility and initiative for waging guerrilla warfare.84 
While Mao mentions cities, he does not discuss their role in the revolutionary struggle in 
detail. He regards the countryside as strategically more important than urban areas. 
 Lin Biao, another Chinese guerrilla, makes the argument that guerrilla 
movements need to bring strategy and tactics together to reach the political goal of a 
successful revolution. For Lin, the importance of the study of warfare lies in adapting it 
to reach political goals. For a popular resistance movement to be successful, the enemy’s 
weak points must be exploited. Lin states: “In the course of protracted armed struggle, we 
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have created a whole range of strategy and tactics of people’s war by which we have been 
able to utilize our strong points to attack the enemy at his weak points.”85  
Lin explains that, “Guerrilla warfare is the only way to mobilize and apply the 
whole strength of the people against the enemy, the only way to expand our forces in the 
course of the war, deplete and weaken the enemy… and finally defeat the enemy.”86 He 
further explains that mobilization of the population is how the Chinese Communist 
Revolution gained enough support to switch to, “large-scale mobile warfare, including 
the storming of big cities.”87 Referring to the ways in which a more powerful enemy 
should be dealt with, Lin acknowledges that direct confrontation is unavoidable. While he 
highlights the importance of sabotage attacks in guerrilla warfare, he makes it clear that 
direct combat with enemy forces is necessary: “It is true that in guerrilla warfare much 
should be done to disrupt and harass the enemy, but it is still necessary actively to 
advocate and fight battles of annihilation whenever conditions are favorable.”88 This 
shows that even though the overall political goals cannot be ignored, these battles of 
annihilation are the crucial element of forcing one’s will upon the enemy. Lin refers to 
the countryside as the main population center that guerrillas should seek to control. As 
urbanization progresses, his comments are a clear reminder that the countryside and the 
hinterland should not be forgotten.89 He explains that cities are the terrain into which a 
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strong adversary should be drawn into and pinned down. This allows the guerrilla 
movement to stretch the enemy’s forces throughout cities and the countryside.90 While he 
does not go into a detailed discussion of how to wage urban warfare, Lin does discuss the 
importance of urban centers for a popular armed struggle and the element of surprise of 
fighting government forces in urban battles. 
Lin’s writing also provides some hints for defeating a guerrilla movement. 
Draining the enemy of his most important resource, the local population, is of paramount 
importance. Over time, this lessens the support that guerrilla groups have in local 
communities.91 Even when alleviating local grievances, however, guerrilla leaders and 
their loyal followers need to be engaged through combat. Doing this without alienating 
the local populace is a difficult, yet necessary task because it is not possible to negotiate 
with everyone.92 It seems that in order to get the local population on your side, one might 
require Machiavellian negotiation tactics to further one’s position through the use of 
diplomacy, as well as the use of force. 
Vietnamese general Giáp states knowledge of different tactics, and understanding 
how to use them is what makes guerrillas such effective warfighters.93 He stresses the 
importance of tactics for a successful guerrilla movement because these allow them to 
engage in battle with government forces and their allies. For Giáp, the use of combat 
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tactics is essential in achieving the political aim of popular resistance.94 This seems to 
differentiate guerrillas from governments. In a guerrilla movement, political goals, 
strategy, and tactics are well aligned. Western governmental structures however, seem to 
make this a much more disjointed endeavor. While strategy is formulated by the 
President and his advisers, the use of force is heavily influenced by the different military 
commands and branches. This is the main reason the Goldwater – Nichols Act was 
introduced in the United States; the concept of joint warfighting was developed as part of 
this.95 Along the same lines, combined warfighting activities are executed by guerrilla 
groups. Guerrillas are willing and able to adapt their strategic objectives, operational 
procedures, and their use of tactics to the terrain they choose to fight in. Giáp sees 
fighting in cities as part of revolutionary warfare. For him all types of terrain - jungles, 
cities, and plains - are part of a combination that characterizes the armed struggle against 
imperialist oppression.96 Hence, guerrillas adapt to the conditions of the terrain they are 
fighting in because it allows them to reach their strategic objectives.  
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Section Conclusion on Guerrilla Strategy and Warfare of the 1960s and 70s 
 
As could be seen, the authors discussed here all agree that a wide range of tactics 
must be employed by guerrillas to attain political goals. In relation to combat, guerrillas 
resort to the tactics that help them maximize the effects of surprise on their enemy. This 
is the best way for a guerrilla force to be victorious in the beginning, when the movement 
is at its weakest. Furthermore, actions undertaken by guerrillas need to bring about 
change in the nation they are fighting in. If they cannot bring about social change, the 
guerrilla movement then fails. 
These different authors state that combat tactics must be used to attain strategic 
objectives and political goals. They make it clear that a strategy cannot be achieved 
without the use of tactics. Advancing revolutionary political goals requires the use of 
different types of warfare. The guerrillas’ willingness to adapt to different environments, 
such as cities and the countryside, requires mental flexibility. They fight where they can 
gain influence.  
Marighella is the only guerrilla fighter and author who focuses on the city as the 
most important area for bringing about socio-political revolution. Half a century ago, 
Marighella was already aware of cities being power centers. They are centers of gravity 
that yield powerful and critical vulnerabilities for both guerrillas and state security forces. 
The vulnerabilities are presented by socio-economic factors and the physical properties of 
a city. Furthermore, cities pose risks for infantry soldiers. The urban environment is very 
difficult to navigate. Troops require a very large amount of intelligence to act effectively. 
This increased intelligence requirement makes it very difficult to create situational 
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awareness and provide actionable intelligence. Yet, these challenges need to be mastered 
by the militaries of democratic countries. Only if security and military forces can manage 
these vulnerabilities and potentially turn them into opportunities, can they be successful 
in urban combat operations.  
Hence, I have reviewed the writings of leading guerrilla thinkers on how 
important cities are for their armed struggles. In the previous section, I laid out a 
foundation for analyzing the importance of urban warfare in policy, strategy, and 
operational conduct. We now turn to a discussion on the challenges of urban warfare. The 
complexity of the modern urban battlefield and the impact that policymakers can have on 
the conduct of operations will become apparent.   
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Chapter 2:  The Problems of Urban Warfare 
 
Strategy and Urban Warfare 
 
To understand the relevance of urban warfare for strategy, we look at how urban 
warfare is utilized in different operational concepts in order to achieve the objectives 
outlined in a strategy. As was mentioned in the introduction, cities have been avoided by 
militaries. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu did not think that urban warfare should not be 
conducted.97 However, as noted earlier, the ever-increasing rate of urbanization will 
inevitably lead politicians to deploy military forces to intervene in cities. The case studies 
in chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate this. Developing a strategy that takes urban areas into 
account is no easy task because there are many factors that affect the outcome of battles 
in densely populated and built-up areas.98 Since the historical record shows that urban 
warfare is extremely brutal, vicious and bloody, this fact needs to be taken into 
consideration by policymakers when they decide whether to commit troops to fighting in 
urban area.99 The decisions made by policymakers and by troops on the ground that are 
caught in the heat of battle lead to a level of complexity that increases the difficulty of 
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successfully conducting urban warfare. As was discussed in chapter 1, the conduct of 
operations is an art of its own. How a military force engages in combat is dependent on 
the battlefield or operating environment it is fighting in. At the strategic level, 
policymakers and military leaders lay out the framework used by commanders to plan 
and execute operations. 
 
The Challenges of Urban Warfare 
 
The complexity of the urban battlefield stems from several key factors. 
Intelligence collection is very difficult, casualties are likely to be very high, the rules of 
engagement (ROE) are likely to be restrictive, technological superiority in joint fires are 
likely to be negated by the operating environment, and urban operations are ground 
combat intensive. This makes urban warfare a more challenging undertaking than 
maneuver warfare. 
Additionally, the complexity of the urban operating environment makes it ever 
more important to have actionable intelligence. A military force can only succeed in 
urban combat operations if its warfighters have heightened situational awareness. This 
allows infantry to keep civilian casualties at a minimum and maintain legitimacy 
throughout the fighting. 
To illustrate this point, a brief discussion of the battles of Stalingrad and Moscow 
will help highlight the challenges urban warfare poses. The cities of Stalingrad and 
Moscow were strongpoints that could have broken the Soviet military. They were of 
historical, symbolic, and military importance, and thus were considered centers of gravity 
 45 
of the Soviet Union. Stalingrad however, was an avoidable battle because it was not of 
military significance. Moscow was the real center of gravity, but Hitler underestimated 
the Soviet commitment to defending this city. His misallocation of resources made it 
impossible for the Wehrmacht to succeed against the Red Army in the battle for Moscow. 
As the offensive actor in these battles, the Wehrmacht had a large interest in winning 
decisively and quickly. Operation Barbarossa was planned accordingly. Hitler, however, 
was not interested in this.100 His strategic misjudgment of the importance of speed in 
urban warfare clearly demonstrates that Hitler did not understand the complexities of the 
urban battlefield. Hitler’s unwillingness to resupply the 6th Army in Stalingrad made this 
fight for the city unnecessarily brutal for Wehrmacht soldiers. Marshall Zhukov’s order 
that every Soviet soldier should fight the Germans until his death contributed heavily to 
this.101 The high level of commitment to tactical engagements shows how Stalin was 
helped in achieving his goal of recapturing cities and taking the offensive to the Germans. 
In both cases, the cities provided the opportunity for the Soviet army to turn the war 
against the Third Reich. Stalin made a smart strategic decision by letting Marshall 
Zhukov and the Soviet General Staff take the lead in repelling the Wehrmacht. While 
Hitler blundered through his Russia campaign and did not listen to his military advisers, 
Stalin let military professionals lead the way in the fight against the Nazis. Maj. Gen. 
Vasili Ivanovich Chuikov took over the defense of Stalingrad on September 13, 1942 and 
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maintained defensive positions against the Nazis.102 As the battle intensified, he observed 
that Soviet soldiers became successful city defenders by fighting “to the last breath.”103 
The Red Army was extremely successful in draining the Wehrmacht of its dominant 
combat power by fighting in small units, with no more than four people per fighting 
group.  
The strategic challenge of urban warfare is that it is very difficult to achieve 
decisive victory without accepting heavy losses. The complexity of the urban battlefield 
only exacerbates this. To maintain legitimacy, militaries of democratic countries must 
take the local population into account and alleviate grievances to the largest extent 
possible.  
                                                
102 Ibid., 35. 
103 Ibid., 50. 
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Counterinsurgency and Urban Warfare 
 
As the historical record indicates, urban warfare is likely to occur as part of a 
counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.104 Counterinsurgency doctrine, spearheaded by 
General Petraeus, also requires the direct use of force to counter insurgencies.105 The use 
of targeted Special Operations is necessary to deal with the hardliners among the 
insurgents. While this is not directly in line with alleviating local grievances, it is a 
necessary measure because it is not possible to deescalate every situation peacefully or 
deradicalize every member of an insurgency. 
The U.S. military’s most recent revision of its counterinsurgency manual devotes 
a section to fighting insurgents. As a field manual, it does not outline the tactical options 
in detail. These can be found in the field manuals that are written for specific battlefields. 
FM 90-1 is the relevant field manual for urban combat at the squad and platoon level 
(these formations are normally made up of 4 to 44 soldiers or Marines).106 To win hearts 
and minds, the deployed combat troops need to understand how to engage with the local 
population.107 This is important because of tactical combat engagements, and there are 
likely to be many of them when soldiers fight in cities. This is the unfortunate reality of 
urban conflict; we have not, nor will we likely be able to avoid urban warfare. Yet, when 
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operations are conducted in densely populated areas, we must try to keep the negative 
effects of urban combat on the local population at a minimum. For this reason, and also 
since the use of tactics is heavily influenced by policymakers, the tactical options that are 
at the disposal of battlefield commanders need to be understood.  
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The Tactical Imperative 
 
Close Quarters Battle (CQB) tactics play a crucial role in achieving policy goals 
in urban warfare. In an increasingly urbanized world, policymakers should understand 
that fighting in urban areas differs from fighting in wide and open terrain such as the 
Fulda Gap. This was an area where there was the possibility of mechanized maneuver 
warfare through coordinated land and air attacks. 108 
The technical aspects of combat deal with the use of weapons in an urban 
environment. The important issues here are barrel length, the type of caliber to be used 
(7.62 x 51mm NATO is desirable), and the preferred auxiliary handgun size, a 9mm. This 
makes it easier to shoot because recoil management is more easily achievable with this 
caliber and warfighters can carry more ammunition.109 
These technical aspects feed into the use of tactics. Which tactics can be 
employed, however, is a matter of how the strategy is framed and how the ROE (rules of 
engagement) are formulated. These are the guidelines on which the operational concepts 
and mission plans are based. An understanding of the tactics that are available to planners 
has been overlooked in the past decades. Strachan states that most security policy 
thinking during the Cold War was dedicated to policy and strategy formulation, and 
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doctrinal revision.110 These large-issue areas, while important, are not what determines 
the outcome of battles. The military’s ability to successfully engage in combat needs to 
be taken into account when looking at formulating a strategy. The extreme option of 
leveling a city as the Russians did in the Battle of Grozny in 2000 is not possible for 
Western democracies. Such an extreme use of force is not in line with the ethics of 
democratic values. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that are at the 
military’s disposal need to be made known to policymakers. Only then can these tactical 
skills and technical capabilities be taken into account. The issues of friction, planning, 
and operational conduct are also considered here to help the reader understand that these 
variables remain the same on every battlefield. 
 
The Urban Operational Environment and Battlefield 
 
The complexity of the urban operating environment is the factor that influences 
most conditions of an urban battlefield. A brief examination of the city and wider urban 
areas as a battlefield makes it clear that this operating environment is different from the 
open battlefields that have been prominent over the past five centuries.  
Cities have always taken a special place in warfare. Since the very first recorded 
stories of mankind, such as the Epic of Gilgamesh, cities have had a central role in battle. 
Gilgamesh built the city wall around Uruk in order to defend it.111 Over time, cities and 
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general urban areas became the sites of numerous and well-known battles such as the 
battles for Aachen112 and Berlin113 during World War Two, the battle to recapture Seoul 
in Korea in 1951, the battle of Hue City, 1968 in Viet Nam,114 and in more recent history 
the battles to reclaim Ramadi115 and Fallujah in Iraq.116 Military operations on urban 
terrain have, as a short account of all battles listed will show, a high casualty rate and a 
high level of attrition.117 The different approaches to Military Operations on Urban 
Terrain (MOUT) were formulated as a response to these changing factors.118 In the 
aftermath of the battles for Fallujah in 2004 and Ramadi in 2007, a new operating 
concept, Joint Urban Operations, was formulated by the US military.119 The 
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transformation from MOUT to Urban Operations shows how urbanization has 
exacerbated the complexity of the urban battlefield. The factors that affect all types of 
warfare can guide policymakers and military planners when dealing with the strategic and 
operational challenges of planning urban warfare campaigns.  
The aim of this thesis is to help policymakers, strategic thinkers, and military 
planners to conceptualize thought about urban warfare as part of their strategy and their 
available operational capacities. This shows the need to acknowledge the importance of 
infantry and the use of Close Quarters Battle (CQB) tactics for success in urban operating 
environments. Analyzing these factors and looking at the case studies will allow for 
recommendations as to how to improve strategic thinking about urban warfare, the 
operating concepts that can be used as starting points for future operational design, and 
the underlying tactics that can be utilized to defeat enemies on the urban battlefield. 
Urban warfare poses a multitude of challenges. It requires us to consider the 
options of using combat operations to help in counterinsurgency campaigns. Strategic 
restraint should be practiced before committing troops to fight in cities.  
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What Tactics should be used in Urban Warfare?  
 
In urban warfare, strict military tactics apply. As defined in chapter 1, tactics are 
“the arrangement and conduct of combat.”120 They are a subset of operations. Tactics are 
the tools that are used to conduct operations and attain strategic objectives. 
Looking at the Commando 21 concept of the United Kingdom’s Royal Marine 
Corps and reports written by American military researchers, it becomes clear that the 
focus on armies, divisions, and brigades of the past thousand years has massive 
implications again now.121 The urban operating environment requires well-trained 
squads, where the single operator can engage the enemy and win. Placing the focus on 
the individual warfighter and the four-man fire team allows warfighters to swarm through 
the urban battlefield.122 
To successfully bring to bear the fighting power of individual squad members in 
an urban operating environment, these squad members need to receive training in Close 
Quarters Battle (CQB) tactics. CQB tactics are useful for the clear-hold-build-transition 
operational concept that is utilized to conduct counterinsurgency operations. CQB is the 
only type of tactic that allows warfighters to successfully engage in combat in urban 
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areas. CQB includes fighting with small arms and combatives.123 The CQB skills of 
every warfighter should be improved to improve the effectiveness of the military to fight 
and win in urban combat engagements.  
The ability to fight with small arms and the use of combatives is important for 
urban warfare. In a very enclosed and restrictive operating environment, the most 
effective combat tools are small arms and hand-to-hand combat techniques.124 While this 
has been well known since the Second World War, the issue now has become that the 
urban battlefield is more complex than the battlefields in former conflicts. Close quarter 
combat is physically taxing and dangerous for soldiers, but it is also a skillset that allows 
policymakers to send warfighters into very difficult operating environments when 
necessary.  
 
How can we deal with the Challenges of Urban Warfare? 
 
What can be done to strategically deal with the problems of urban warfare? The 
difficulty of the urban terrain, planning and conducting operations, and providing 
intelligence in this difficult operating environment are the major factors that make urban 
warfare so challenging. As was discussed in chapter 1, a successful strategy requires a 
well-formulated policy and operational planning. The complexity of urban areas is only 
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going to increase through exacerbating urbanization. The sound strategic choice for 
dealing with urban warfare is to emphasize the operational level. Operational design for 
combat in urban environments requires a clear embrace of the shape – clear – hold – 
build – transition approach stated in chapter 9 of FM 3 – 24.125 The clearing element, i.e. 
the tactics to engage and defeat an enemy in an urban environment, is contingent upon 
the military and intelligence community’s ability to have the political support to conduct 
targeted Special Operations. The majority of popular support can be turned in one’s favor 
by winning hearts and minds, and controlling the population.126 The radical hardliners 
and ideologues, and the center of gravity of a sub – state actor group, however, must be 
taken on directly. To that end, the tactical toolkit that is at the disposal of military forces 
needs to be understood by policymakers. A more holistic understanding of tactics can 
then be integrated in the formulation of the rules of engagement (ROE). As the ROE 
guide the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) that are used by the infantry, they have a direct impact on the outcome 
of tactical engagements.  
The better policymakers and civilian government officials understand how their 
strategy and the ROE affect the TTPs and SOPs through which warfighters can bring to 
bear their combat power in an urban operating environment that is complex because of its 
architecture [terrain] and the presence of civilians and other non – combatants in these 
cross-sectional urban spaces, the easier it will be for combat troops to conduct missions 
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in urban areas. In this kind of operating environment, Operations Other Than War 
(OOTW) such as COIN, and Stability Operations are likely to occur in conjunction with 
combat (kinetic) operations. The case studies in chapters 3 and 4 showcase this. 
Improvements in direct action capabilities can increase the operational options at the 
disposal of policymakers and battlefield commanders. The infantry squad and the 
potential “Commando 21” structure must take a more prominent role in training and pre – 
deployment preparation. In the past decade, several monographs and papers on this topic 
have been published by TRADOC’s Combat Studies Institute and the School of 
Advanced Military Studies at the Command and General Staff College, all located at Fort 
Leavenworth, KS.127 These efforts however, are not enough. 
With urban areas already at the center of modern campaigns, the preparation of 
squads needs to be made a more central part of the military maintenance and preparation 
efforts. To allow policymakers the option of deploying troops to urban combat zones, the 
joint force needs to be centered around ground combat troops. If policymakers and 
national security staff want to rely on the military to conduct operations in urban 
environments, the ability to wage urban warfare must be improved.  
Taking on this field on the military side requires a better understanding of the 
urban operating environment and how to conduct operations in it. Since the mid – 1990s, 
it has been clear that intelligence gathering is essential in urban areas (HUMINT).128 
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Only if this effort is reinforced can intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
remain an asset when confronting urban warfare situations, whether these occur in 
shantytowns or megacities of the future. Infantry troop training needs to be updated. 
Infantry squad tactics can become more flexible by emphasizing the importance of 
individual tactics and techniques, and the randomness of tactics and techniques in urban 
warfare. Allowing squad leaders flexibility in the selection of tactics provides them with 
more options to fulfill a mission.129 (For more details, please refer to the 
Recommendations section.)   
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Urban Operations 
 
Urban operations are the most recent revision of operational doctrine for urban 
warfare.130 The proposed ROE try to safeguard the civilian population and the non-
combatants in the field of operations. Tactical responses that deal more with the combat 
engagements are, however, not discussed in this thesis. Direct action missions, infantry 
combat and rifle squad tactics, and the use of infantry units for counterinsurgency are 
available in other publications.131 These different publications deal with Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), operations 
design, and doctrine. The ability to use these in urban environments is necessary to fulfill 
the mission objectives. Only if these objectives are achieved, can policy goals be reached. 
To fulfill these objectives, operations need to be conducted.132  
The military component of fulfilling mission objectives is to maintain and 
improve the ability to conduct joint urban operations. While these military operations are 
executed by military personnel, they are guided by the directives of policymakers. These, 
through the issued ROE, have a direct effect on the way operations are conducted.  
Successful urban operations require a wide range of operating procedures. 
Policymakers are not involved in planning military operations. To effectively link urban 
operations back to policy, the tactics and procedures that the military has at its disposal 
need to be communicated to them. This, in theory, would allow for an improvement in 
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the formulation of strategic goals in relation to conducting combat operations in urban 
environments.  
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Difficulties of Urban Warfare: Combat Tactics and Policymakers 
 
 The field manuals and tactics available to the infantrymen engaging in combat are 
not well known in policymaking circles. A perfect example of this is the Army’s FM 2 – 
22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations. While many policymakers are critical of 
the manual’s “Appendix M: Restricted Interrogation Technique – Separation”,133 it can 
be assumed that most of these policymakers have not read this part of the manual.  
This is not the fault of policymakers. Field manuals, doctrinal publications, and 
operations manuals are documents written for internal use by military professionals. They 
do not have a political audience in mind. There is very little that can be done to remedy 
this. Yet, there is an example of a policymaker making a bright decision for military 
personnel at the tactical level: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s role in the 
creation of the United States’ Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) 
and the reorganization of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 
that coincided with this.134 The reforms improved the effectiveness of these units 
considerably.  
In October 2005, the creation of MARSOC was initiated by then Secretary 
Rumsfeld. The unique skillset of the Marine Corps’ reconnaissance forces was seen as an 
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asset by Secretary Rumsfeld to conduct special missions.135 Rumsfeld’s wide – ranging 
reforms for the Department of Defense and USSOCOM were the primary reason that 
these units and their specialized tactical skills gained more prominence in policymaking 
circles. These tactics became crucial elements in the fight against Al Qaida and its 
affiliate in Iraq, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).136 In particular, CQB tactics became ever more 
important as the Multi – National Force Iraq (MNF-I) conducted raids and direct action 
missions in Iraq. From this it can be seen that the use of tactics heavily depends on the 
ROE that policymakers decide to use as the guide for achieving their policy goals and 
strategic objectives.  
 
Civil – Military Affairs, Tactics, and Urban Warfare 
 
Policymakers do not seem to understand tactics. They do not need to know about 
them to formulate policy. Passing legislative reforms and submitting acts does not require 
an understanding of violence, but of the inner workings of government. Government 
officials throughout NATO member states and their allies need to be provided with an 
assessment of the importance of tactics. The more complex the operating environment 
becomes, the bigger the tactical toolkit must become. Hence, tactics are becoming an ever 
more important factor.  
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I believe that this disconnect is more the result of the increasing complexity of 
warfare than the result of an active disconnect between politicians and military 
professionals because the topic has become so complex. Explaining the importance of a 
wide array of tactics to policymakers and government officials is the role that experts in 
this field need to take on. 
To ensure the successful conduct of urban (warfare) operations, combat tactics 
need to be clear. The ROE that policymakers formulate are the ramifications for a 
successful campaign to succeed in an urban area. Ridding ourselves of overly 
complicated definitions of strategy will allow us to focus most efforts on identifying 
salient strategic objectives and devising the operational concepts necessary to achieve 
them. As was demonstrated in chapter 1, policy, strategy, and tactics are interconnected. 
The ROE guide the use of tactics and affect the conduct of operations.  
How do we solve this issue? We must clearly and concisely communicate how to 
improve political understanding of the importance of tactics for the design and conduct of 
operations. The urban operating environment requires combat troops to have a broad 
spectrum of tactics with which they can successfully close in and destroy enemy forces. 
Setting lofty policy goals that do not take the on-the-ground situation into account is a 
risk factor that adversely affects the conduct of operations.  
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Strategy, Rules of Engagement, and Tactics 
 
The rules of engagement (ROE) are political while combat tactics are military in 
nature. Yet, the ROE guide the use of tactics throughout the conduct of operations. The 
urban operating environment requires combat troops to have a broad spectrum of tactics 
with which they can successfully close in and destroy enemy forces. Setting lofty policy 
goals that do not take the on-the-ground situation into account is a risk factor that 
adversely affects the conduct and outcome of operations. ROE are political but they 
affect how tactics can be used by military professionals. ROE should be defined after 
their potential effects have been understood by the politicians who draw up the policy 
from which the ROE are derived. This way, policymakers will have a direct effect on the 
battlefield.137  
This is crucial for the practice of urban warfare, where the ROE are so very vital, 
so that the military does not lose its legitimacy when fighting, especially in relation to 
conducting urban warfare operations as part a counterinsurgency campaign.  
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The Urban Battlefield: From Shantytowns to Large and Megacities 
 
The range of military operations that can be executed in urban environments 
depends mostly on the variety of tactics that can be utilized. The battlespace affects a 
fighting force’s level of effectiveness. The urban operating environment largely 
diminishes this.138  
The urban operating environment is a cross – sectional space. Martin Krieger has 
defined urban space as having many layers and possessing “vitality”.139 Conflicts in cities 
can drain a city of its life.140 As Norton observes, finding a balance between waging 
battle and preserving livable conditions in large urban areas is especially difficult.141 
Shantytowns can cover large areas but their infrastructure is not very 
sophisticated. The areas they cover, however, make it very difficult for combat teams to 
navigate them. Megacities, on the other hand, have a population of at least ten million 
people. While these types of cities do not exist yet, large cities clearly do. It is safe to 
assume that megacities will have several features. Sophisticated infrastructure systems, 
suburban spaces and skyscrapers, and a plethora of different ethnic cultures are likely to 
make the megacities of the future difficult to secure. 
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To take on these challenges strategically, planning, force structure, and new 
operating concepts need to be developed. Multi-domain Battle Concept is an example of 
an operating concept that fits into the larger strategic picture in urban warfare.142 While 
there are already some existing operational concepts for urban warfare, the diversity of 
urban environments suggests that more urban warfare operational concepts should be 
developed.143 This would allow the military to take on the challenges of urban warfare 
from a more strategic position, allowing them to conduct operations to achieve the 
objectives set out in a strategy.  
 
The Urban Combat Spectrum: Why fighting in Cities is as important as winning 
hearts and minds 
 
As has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, the ability to fight is of 
paramount importance in cities. Formulating a strategy that takes urban warfare into 
account requires combat operations to be taken into consideration when developing a 
counterinsurgency campaign plan. While it is difficult for policymakers to explain, 
fighting still counts in urban areas. 
In his classic book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, David 
Galula discusses the interrelationship of tactics and strategy for insurgency warfare. 
Galula highlights that there are several crucial points that insurgents must take into 
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account to wage a successful insurgency.144 He also explains that there are several steps 
that can be taken to actively fight an insurgency. The majority of his recommendations 
directly refer to combat operations against insurgents.145 
 Guerrillas, terrorists, and violent gangs need to use a wide array of tactics because 
they lack the resources a state has at its disposal. Especially in regard to combat 
engagements, non-state groups lack the tactical abilities to hold ground. The level of 
complexity that urban areas add to combat indirectly increases the fighting capabilities of 
asymmetric fighting forces. Hence, this more complex terrain is not easily conquered by 
states, but more easily defendable for non-state actors.  
 To assure that deployed combat and stabilization forces have the ability to engage 
in urban combat successfully, policymakers need to enable them to do so. This is only 
possible if the ROE and tactics can be incorporated into a strategy that allows the combat 
forces to dominate the enemy. Thus, whatever type of combat mission is authorized, it 
needs to be in line with the policy goals that have been laid out.  
 
Policy Goals in Urban Warfare 
 
Most issues related to combat tie back to achieving political goals.146 While 
Laqueur cites many issues as important to guerrillas, the struggle against the people in 
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power remains their main concern. To be successful in this struggle, many factors must 
be taken into account. In relation to policy, this means that non-state actors try to affect 
political change in a society by influencing the local population. While this can have 
positive effects when groups fight for freedom and against oppressive governments, the 
influence exerted on people has been more violent and negative. An example of this is 
AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq), now better known as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), 
which was the most violent terrorist group during the Iraq war.147 Such violent behavior 
however, is counterproductive for non-state actors. In this specific case, the United States 
and Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNF-I) were able to use violent acts committed by 
AQI to turn public opinion against them. This was part of the Surge in Iraq in 2007 and 
contributed to the U.S.’s overall policy goal of stabilizing Iraq.148 
Achieving policy goals therefore, requires political leaders to be willing to 
authorize the used combat tactics that can be very risky for the local population. This 
balance between combat and non-kinetic tactics is only achievable through good 
operations planning. Urban warfare will not be avoided in the future. Understanding what 
tools are at the disposal of the military is part of creating a holistic “whole of government 
(WOG) approach” that takes the largest possible number of solutions into account from 
which choices can be made. 
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Chapter 2 Conclusion 
 
Urbanization is transforming the paradigm of urban conflict and combat. As we 
could see, the freedom fighters and guerrillas of the 1960s and 70s were of the opinion 
that their political activities and propaganda operations were necessary to support their 
armed struggle against the “Establishment” and its henchmen. The social aspects of 
counterinsurgency should, by no means, be ignored. However, in the struggles for 
Baghdad, Basra, Ramadi, and now Mosul, combat was and is the key element that allows 
government forces to turn the tide against the insurgents and terrorists who were / are not 
willing to surrender their positions without a fight.149  Also, in the case of the attacks in 
Europe on Paris, Brussels, and Munich, the ability of police forces to engage the attackers 
in firefights in these urban environments were necessary, albeit bloody. Programs to 
counter radicalization by White Supremacists, Jihadists, violent left-wing extremist 
groups, and gangs have their place. In the same spirit, governments need to be able to 
tactically overpower these types of groups in urban combat since the likelihood of them 
giving up peacefully is not very high. Both kinetic and non - kinetic tactics must be 
understood to be part of a comprehensive strategy that allows commanders to use a wide 
array of combat tactics. Kinetic tactics include combat tactics to directly fight and defeat 
an enemy. Non-kinetic tactics focus much more on helping the local population to win 
them over. An example of this is providing water and food during a counterinsurgency 
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campaign. This shows the locals that the military is not fighting the people, but is 
interested in their wellbeing.  
We now turn to two contemporary case studies on urban warfare. The complexity 
of the modern urban battlefield will become apparent, along with the importance of the 
role of policymakers in battlefield actions. It will also become clear that the interrelations 
between policy, operations, and the use of tactics require a clearly defined strategy.  
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Chapter 3: Case Study One – Operation Protective Edge 
 
Israel’s Security Policy and Strategy towards Gaza 
 
The state of Israel has a three-pronged approach to maintaining its security. The 
three elements are: maintaining conventional force superiority over potential adversary 
nations, preventing terrorist attacks in Israel, and employing decapitation strikes and raids 
to render an adversary inoperable.150 While Hamas is the ruling Palestinian party, it 
tactically behaves like a non-state actor in conflict. Hamas fighters do not engage in 
symmetric conflict with the IDF. 
As part of this strategy, Israel employs several technologies that enable them to 
defend against missile strikes, maintain a border maintenance system, and detect tunnels 
that can be used both for maintaining the economy in Gaza but also for planning terrorist 
attacks against Israeli civilians. While the importance of technology for missile defense 
and for tunnel detection cannot be denied, the use of these technologies does not resolve 
the underlying security issues.   
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Background – Israeli Infantry in Urban Combat 
 
Operation Protective Edge took place in Gaza in the summer of 2014. The 
operation was under review by the Israeli state comptroller, Yosef Shapira. The report 
was published on February 28, 2017.151 
As policy goals and strategic objectives can only be attained if tactics can be 
brought to bear on the battlefield, the ways in which forces are employed determines the 
success of operations. This, in turn, affects the success or failure of strategy and policy. 
The main issue was connecting the tactical actions of the Israeli Defense Force 
(IDF) to the policy goals of the Israeli government. This lead to the change from the use 
of aerial bombardment to deploying IDF infantry in the Gaza Strip. This case study 
reviews the strategy, operational concepts, and tactics that were used by the IDF and 
Hamas in Operation Protective Edge. 
The overreliance on air power is not an effective way to conduct urban operations. 
At first, it appears that the IDF had not learned its lessons from Operations Pillar of 
Defense (2012) and Cast Lead (2009). Both these operations relied heavily on the use of 
air power. This resulted in large numbers of Palestinian civilian casualties.  
As the fight carried on, the IDF and Israeli political leadership realized the 
importance of tactics, and that technology alone cannot bring about victory. CQB tactics 
bear more importance in urban combat than technological superiority. After initially 
trying to dominate Hamas’ position purely through the use of air power, the Israeli 
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government decided to use ground combat troops. Regular infantry formations as well as 
IDF Special Forces units were deployed in the second stage of the operation.  
As IDF operations show, the evolution of these ideas is constantly ongoing.152 
Combat is fluid. The use of CQB tactics has intensified in the Gaza Strip as operating 
concepts have evolved from Operation Cast Lead (2009), over Operation Pillar of 
Defense (2012), to Operation Protective Edge (2014). Operation Protective Edge is an 
example of a conventional military force confronting an asymmetric opponent in an 
urban operating environment.153   
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The Operational Environment: Built-up Areas 
 
 The Gaza Strip is a densely populated urban area. Separating targets from 
innocent civilians proves very difficult for the IDF. Yet, civilian casualty numbers are 
very low. The main reason for these low numbers are the ROE that informed IDF 
commanders and soldiers in Operation Protective Edge.  
The Hamas tunnel system highlights the importance of CQB tactics in urban 
warfare. The tunnel system was developed by Hamas to subvert Israeli government 
forces. The tunnels led to IDF security posts and Israeli schools, and were supposed to 
enable Hamas to execute terror attacks more easily by lowering the likelihood of their 
fighters being exposed before they could carry out a terror attack. The effective use of 
CQB tactics allowed the IDF to directly attack Hamas fighters and isolate them from 
civilian Palestinians.   
 
Fighting in Tunnel Systems 
 
Tunnel systems and asymmetric warfare practices affected the urban warfare 
conduct by the IDF. As IDF Brig. Gen. Nechemya Sokal states, new operating concepts 
are important for this kind of warfare (despite new innovations in ISR technologies): 
‘We developed doctrine and training [for] our forces in order to mitigate this challenge. 
Not only finding the tunnel, but also how to deal with it after we find it. How to map it, 
how to get inside it if it is needed—and we prefer not to—and how to destroy it.’ 
Both doctrine and technology also impact a uniquely challenging aspect of tunnel 
warfare: actually fighting in them. ‘Fighting in this environment brings a whole new 
challenge to the fighting units,’ Sokal says. “We have to change our doctrine . . . because 
underground facilities are not so intuitive as buildings and places we are used to being.’ 
Technology also offers a key solution. “This kind of environment—underground 
facilities and tunnels—is a risky environment. Fighting in it, and mapping it, and 
collecting information about it is a risky mission. And if you can do these missions 
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without risking your soldiers, I think we should prefer to do it in this way. Robots are a 
very effective tool to reduce the risk. We tried and succeeded to develop special robots to 
fit this mission.’ Moving forward, Gen. Sokal does not believe that technology will play a 
dominant role in tunnel warfare. He does not believe that the importance of combat 
troops will be replaced by autonomous systems. ‘…. for example, moral decisions, even. 
To target a house, if it has civilians in it or not. These are decisions we won’t let 
machines do.’154  
 
Thus, the IDF sent soldiers directly into the tunnel systems to deal with the threat. 
However, the tunnels were only rendered non-operational when the IDF flooded many of 
them. This tactic was also continuously used after Operation Protective Edge had ended. 
Egypt reportedly flooded dozens of the remaining tunnels in December 2016.155 The 
tunnels are important to Hamas, since they seem to be using them for smuggling and also 
for conducting terror attacks.  
 
Israeli Political Fallout 
 
Operation Protective Edge has received much media and political attention. As the 
issues relating to the operation are mostly political, a review was ordered by the Israeli 
government. State Comptroller Yosef Shapira was put in charge of the review process.156 
There is a large amount of confusion concerning the roles of decision-makers and senior 
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military officials, and parts of the pertaining report having been leaked. Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu may be involved.157 This shows that internal political problems 
influenced a complex urban operation and hence complicated matters further.  
Shapira has been very vocal about the mistakes made by policymakers. The 
former head of Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service, has stated: “The only 
advantage the state comptroller has over the subjects of his audits is the perspective 
gained by hindsight. This may prevent him from walking a real mile in decision-makers' 
shoes. Sometimes breaking protocol is necessary.”158 
 
Urban Warfare and the IDF 
 
 The IDF has the largest urban warfare training program in the world. This gives 
the IDF a good opportunity to train warfighters in the conduct of urban operations and the 
use of CQB tactics.  
The tunnel system that the IDF was confronted with in Gaza was uncharted 
military territory. Up to this point, the IDF did not have to deal with this kind of an 
operating environment. Therefore, the tunnel system placed a large burden on the tactical 
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abilities of the IDF159 , and hence was both a tactical and an operational challenge for the 
IDF. In the end, the IDF flooded the majority of the tunnels to render them useless.160 
However, the IDF still needed to engage in close quarters engagements with Hamas 
fighters. This shows that the tunnel threat only exacerbated the difficulties and dangers of 
urban warfare.  
 
Hamas’ Center of Gravity 
 
 At first, Hamas’ center of gravity were the streets and houses of the Gaza Strip. 
As the Israeli air campaign commenced, Hamas shifted the center of gravity of its 
fighting force to its tunnel system. This made it much easier for Hamas fighters to defend 
their positions.  
 
War Crimes Allegations 
 
The Israeli government has stated that Hamas committed war crimes in the course 
of this conflict.161 The overall complexity of the situation makes it likely that the IDF 
itself did kill civilians, especially at the beginning of the operation. It remains to be seen 
whether the rest of the allegations are also going to be proven. If these were proven to be 
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correct, then the IDF violated the LOAC (Law of Armed Conflict) and its own ROE.162 
The extent to which the political confusion in the government could have been at fault 
remains inconclusive. 
 Similarly, Hamas has been charged with war crimes. Rockets were launched 
directly at civilian Israeli targets. As for the IDF, the investigations are still ongoing. The 
Israeli High Command is fighting the lawsuits in court.163 It should be noted that an 
expert group comprised of high level military officers from different nations wrote a 
report on the IDF’s conduct during Operation Protective Edge. The High Level Military 
Group (HLMG) found that the IDF in fact exceeded expectations in regard to trying to 
keep the civilian Palestinian population safe.164 
The IDF was aware of the LOAC and planned its engagement accordingly.165 This 
also influenced the decision to deploy ground troops because the use of ground troops 
demonstrates the legitimate use of force while taking the utmost precautions to safeguard 
the civilian population. Prior to the deployment of ground forces however, the Israeli 
government took several steps to prevent terrorist attacks (as is their security policy). 
These steps were implemented over the past decades. These approaches included the use 
of several technologies. The efforts made by the IDF included the following measures: 
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The civilian population in Gaza was warned before the IDF attacked any area. 
While this diminishes the military’s ability to exploit the element of surprise in combat, it 
enables civilians to leave an area before fighting occurs.166 
The IDF also used so-called roof knocker bombs to warn people that their house 
would be struck by a bomb or missile. Roof knocker bombs do not contain explosives; 
they are used to warn civilians of an incoming airstrike.167 In some instances, this lead to 
Palestinians climbing onto roofs to prevent Israeli airstrikes.168 
Fences have been built as part of Israel’s strategy to prevent terrorist attacks on 
Israeli soil. Here, the importance of the creating physical barriers contributed to Hamas 
using rockets and digging tunnels to attack Israeli citizens. Other tunnel systems were 
dug by Hamas since the 1980s to help keep Gaza’s economy afloat.169 
While all these high-tech capabilities are deployed, I argue that wars and conflicts 
are fought with technology but won by soldiers. Thus, the use of infantry was a necessary 
move to counter the asymmetric threat Hamas posed to the Israeli population.  
Despite treating Hamas as a terrorist organization, Israel is still obligated to 
adhere to the LOAC while engaging in combat. Hamas conducts much of its warfare 
using terrorist tactics. This means that Israel has the right to defend itself against it. As 
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Hamas leaders head the Palestinian authority, they also control an internationally 
recognized government. In contrast, the State of Israel assessed that Hamas and other 
terrorist organizations present in Gaza actively tried to violate the LOAC in an attempt to 
create fear in the Israeli population.170 This however, legitimized the deployment of 
ground forces by the IDF because the Israeli population saw what was happening and 
acknowledged the need for launching ground combat operations into Gaza.  
In relation to the complexity of urban warfare and politics, these allegations will 
only make it even more difficult for Israel and Palestine to resolve their decades-long 
conflict. The death of innocent civilians, especially children, only makes this harder.  
Gaza has seen three major conflicts in the past eleven years. From Operation Cast 
Lead, over Operation Pillar of Defense, to Operation Protective Edge the number of close 
quarters combat engagements seems to have increased. Since Protective Edge’s ground 
campaign was the longest one, Israeli willingness to engage in close quarters combat 
allowed the IDF to wage a successful ground campaign. Furthermore, it allowed them to 
keep many civilians in Gaza safe. The willingness to use ground combat forces, 
combined with ROE that allowed the IDF to be mindful of civilians, enabled the IDF to 
successfully engage Hamas fighters. This was only possible because the IDF infantry 
undergoes extensive urban combat training.171 Thus, as I have laid out this thesis, victory 
in this urban conflict was driven by the military’s ability to use CQB tactics and the 
political will to let the infantry use them.  
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Victory? 
 
While the IDF was successful in their fight against Hamas, there was no decisive 
victory. What has become apparent, however, is that political meddling interfered in the 
IDF’s operation.172 As there has been much political fallout in Israel over this operation, 
the lessons that can be drawn from it are threefold.  
First, the IDF did rely too heavily on the use of air power in the early stages of the 
operations, which did not have the desired effect. One observer noted: 
The images of dead Palestinian civilians that quickly went viral on social media during 
the operation placed Israel on the public relations defensive, with army spokespeople and 
politicians forced to explain to the international press how Israel was making every effort 
to avoid harming noncombatants.173 
 
The use of air power did not allow Israel to win a quick decisive victory. In fact, 
dropping bombs exacerbated the problem. Instead of making an effort to alleviate as 
many grievances as possible from the start, the bombing campaign reinforced the 
tensions between Israel and Palestine.174 The decision to mobilize ground forces then 
only allowed for maintaining the status quo of the overall Israel – Palestine conflict. The 
IDF’s use of ground troops did, however, lead to tactical successes.  
Second, Israeli soldiers successfully destroyed the tunnel system built by Hamas. 
This, however, required political will more than tactical ability. The fact that the IDF was 
                                                
172 Allon, “Report on Cabinet’s Actions during 2014 Gaza Fighting to Be Released.” 
173 “IDF Gears up for War Crimes Accusations, Plans Internal Review of Gaza Operation.” 
174 White, “The Combat Performance of Hamas in the Gaza War of 2014 | Combating Terrorism 
Center at West Point.” 
 81 
able to destroy the tunnel systems once they had been ordered to do so shows that the 
tactical knowledge was already present in the IDF.  
Third, the nexus where policymakers and military strategists interact cannot be 
ignored. Operation Protective Edge was wrought with political infighting between 
various government officials. It is a sign of a lack of political leadership if this kind of 
political fallout drags on for years. At the INSS Conference in January 2017, the political 
issues surrounding Operation Protective Edge were among the main talking points, and 
sparked much controversy.175  
The review report is a clear example of this. Although the report has not yet been 
published, parts of the document have been leaked to the press. Deep divides between 
politicians in the Israeli government were revealed. The IDF was very capable of 
responding to the threat posed by Hamas’ tunnel system, but internal Israeli government 
politics were a potential source of risk.176 It seems that the political dimension of 
Operation Protective Edge could have been detrimental to the combat operation.177  
It can be concluded, therefore, that tactical proficiency is as important as salient 
policy. The tactical successes that the IDF had were clearly hampered by the internal 
rivalry between politicians and government officials. Therefore, the events surrounding 
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Operation Protective Edge are evidence that the strategic importance of urban warfare 
requires both clear policy guidelines and overwhelming tactical ability for a strategy to be 
successful. Without the support of politicians and decision-makers, military tactical 
experts cannot fulfill the objectives they are ordered to reach.  
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Chapter 3 Conclusion 
 
The events of Operation Protective Edge show that urban warfare evolves 
constantly. Combat is fluid.178 The use of CQB tactics has intensified in the Gaza Strip as 
operating concepts have evolved since Operation Cast Lead and Operation Pillar of 
Defense were conducted. Operation Protective Edge is an example of a conventional 
military force confronting an asymmetric opponent in an urban operating environment.179  
The urban operational environment is an extremely difficult battlefield. Urban 
warfare, as a component of urban conflict, affects policy, strategy, the conduct of 
operations, and the use of tactics. As urban warfare is an exceptionally difficult part of 
dealing with urban conflict, it requires clear strategic objectives. This is only possible if 
the policymakers are aware of the tactical tools that are available to the military. Political 
decision-makers choosing air power over the deployment of ground combat troops did 
not yield the desired results. The change from aerial precision strikes to the use of 
infantry, however, did result in many tactical successes being achieved. This, on the other 
hand, did not change the status quo that exists between Israel and Hamas. As could be 
seen in this case study, a diverse set of tactics must be balanced to fit the needs of the 
operations that are being conducted. Only if this is done, can operations contribute to 
attaining strategic objectives and policy goals.  
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Chapter 4: Case Study Two – Retaking Eastern Mosul 
 
Background 
 
The timeline for this case study is March 24, 2016 to January 24, 2017. When 
President Trump was inaugurated on January 20, 2017, no immediate changes were made 
to the United States strategy to counter ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). The 
retaking of eastern Mosul on January 24, 2017 justifies this timeline. Even as this thesis 
is being written, the western part of Mosul is still under ISIL control.  
The operation in this case study demonstrates the need to secure the wider 
battlespace, and to establish control of access and choke points so that control of the city 
can be regained by retaking the city. The use of CQB tactics as the means to oust ISIL 
from eastern Mosul was necessary, otherwise the political objective of retaking the city 
would not have been achieved. The fight for Mosul exemplifies how a military operation 
is conducted to reach a strategic objective, thereby attaining policy goals.  
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U.S. Policy Goals 
 
The United States, as the main driving force behind Operation Inherent Resolve, 
stated that its goal was to “degrade and destroy” the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL).180 This statement was made by President Obama back in 2014.  
This policy goal was not a unilateral decision by the United States. While the 
United States is clearly taking the leading role in Operation Inherent Resolve, President 
Obama coordinated the goal with his country’s close allies from around the world.181 
NATO and Arab countries are contributing to the goal of degrading and destroying ISIL. 
These international partners are taking on different roles in the fight against ISIL.182 
 
The Position of the Iraqi Government 
 
The Iraqi government clearly stated that it will lead the fight against ISIL in Iraq. 
This was exemplified by the use of Iraqi military forces to envelop and isolate Mosul.183  
 Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi announced the deployment of Iraqi troops to 
fight ISIL and retake Mosul. He also requested additional U.S. military personnel to help 
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https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/09/10/president-obama-we-will-degrade-and-ultimately-
destroy-isil. 
181 Ibid. 
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February 17, 2017, http://www.inherentresolve.mil/About-Us/. 
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with the liberation of the city.184 In keeping with the tradition of counterinsurgency, the 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and their U.S. allies would work together to retake Mosul.  
Iraqi government forces and U.S. Special Forces cooperated in the battle for 
eastern Mosul to use ground combat troops more effectively. While President Obama 
deployed more troops to Syria and Iraq, thereby taking on more political risk, the issue 
was that the American and Iraqi forces had to coordinate their actions in a better way.185 
By advising and assisting the ISF in the fight directly, U.S. Special Forces were able to 
contribute their knowledge and experience of urban warfare to the battle for East Mosul.  
While the Iraqi government has a more immediate interest in degrading and 
destroying by retaking Mosul, the Iraqi strategic objective has been identical with the 
position of the United States. This goes to show that even in an international setting, the 
alignment of policy, strategy and tactics is possible. The ground campaign against ISIL in 
East Mosul could only be initiated through U.S. – Iraqi cooperation. Attaching American 
military advisers to Iraqi troops and assigning them the task of retaking East Mosul 
enabled success on the tactical level. Having examined the policy positions, we now turn 
to the strategy of this fight.  
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Strategy 
 
Policy guided the development of a strategy that relied heavily on aiding the Iraqi 
and Kurdish forces through air strikes. No large formations of ground troops were to be 
deployed to Iraq or Syria to fight ISIL. This is still the case as this thesis is being 
written.186 Special Forces troops were, however, deployed to provide military assistance 
to the Iraqi ground offensive.187 
These military advisers have played a decisive role in planning the assault on 
Mosul.188 Acting as force multipliers, the United States Special Forces along with their 
Iraqi counterparts were able to enter the city of Mosul on March 24, 2016.189 The 
strategic objective of the operation is to recapture Mosul, thereby reclaiming ISIL’s last 
stronghold in Iraq.190 The majority of the force involved in the campaign for eastern 
Mosul were Iraqi troops, with US Special Forces assuming a supporting role.191  
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ISIL’s Center of Gravity 
 
ISIL chose the city of Mosul as its center of gravity. As Malsin states: “Mosul is 
the largest population center under ISIS control, a key source of prestige and resources 
and a living advertisement for the group’s claim that it is building a state.”192  
This highlights why urban warfare is so very difficult. By utilizing the entire city 
as its strongpoint, ISIL has made it very difficult for U.S. and Iraqi forces to target ISIL 
fighters. As discussed in chapter 1, Clausewitzian theory dictates that one should destroy 
the enemy’s center of gravity to defeat them. This is not possible if one wants to retake a 
city instead of destroying it. Also, a government and its policymakers cannot expect 
soldiers to fight against a brutalizing force such as ISIL and allow one’s warfighters to 
attack both enemies and civilians indiscriminately. This is neither moral nor just, nor is it 
in the interest of the strategic objective.193  
As was discussed in chapter 2, the city has multiple dimensions. Thus, fighting 
takes place in the streets, sewage systems, and in buildings. This was no different in East 
Mosul.194 The complexity of the urban operating environment increases the level of 
difficulty for fighting troops. To achieve this, points of efforts need to be chosen. It is 
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important that combat troops are given enough freedom to act in a manner they deem 
helpful for achieving the mission they are conducting.195 These steps are necessary to 
take on a city’s infrastructure as the center of gravity. Since the city is what is being 
fought for in urban warfare, destroying its infrastructure would not lead to victory. 
 
ROE in Eastern Mosul 
 
In eastern Mosul, air strikes were not to be executed if civilians were thought to 
be present in the target area. It should be borne in mind that aerial bombardment can be 
rendered ineffective by the urban operating environment. If a fighting force is trying to 
free a city from a terrorist group such as ISIL, then civilian casualties must be avoided to 
the largest extent possible. In fact, if a country is exercising the responsibility to protect 
(R2P), it must adhere to the Geneva Convention and the Laws of War.196 This is reflected 
in the ROE that the Iraqi and U.S. forces were subjected to. The local Iraqi forces, in 
conjunction with U.S. support, were also able to follow this framework. As a young 
democracy, Iraq must strive to uphold the highest standards of international law. 
Similarly, the United States as a mature Western democracy cannot act in violation of 
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international law if it wishes to maintain legitimacy during and after a conflict. 
Counterinsurgency doctrine takes these issues of legitimacy and governance into account. 
In keeping with the tradition of counterinsurgency, the United States sent military 
advisers to help the Iraqi government take on ISIL in eastern Mosul.197  The 
counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that it is very 
important to enable the host nation to solve its own problems.198 However, 
counterinsurgency doctrine does not specify how to approach the issue of urban warfare. 
As one of the few nations that has gathered a fair amount of combat experience in urban 
areas in the past ten years, the United States had to be heavily involved in the battle for 
eastern Mosul. While such extensive involvement is not an ideal approach to 
counterinsurgency, it is an unavoidable action in the context of urban warfare.  
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The Fight for Eastern Mosul 
 
Iraqi and U.S. forces faced a battle-hardened and relentless enemy in the streets, 
houses, and tunnels of Mosul. It took ground troops one hundred days to recapture 
eastern Mosul.199  
Streets were very difficult to retake because they expose warfighters to enemy 
fire. The use of shoulder-launched rocket systems (MANPADS) by ISIL fighters made 
the use of tanks and armored personnel vehicles (APVs) very dangerous. It was difficult 
for the U.S. and Iraqi forces to use vehicles while fighting in the streets. U.S. and Iraqi 
infantry fought in small and larger units. This enabled them to take on ISIL fighters in 
direct engagement while taking care not to kill innocent civilians. Thus, the fighting in 
the streets of Mosul clearly shows the importance of ground combat troops.  
Houses proved difficult to retake because ISIL was using fighters and unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs; commonly known as drones) to secure them.200 The combination 
of fighters and UAVs is difficult to counteract. ISIL used these UAVs to drop bombs on 
houses.201 These bombs made it difficult for Iraqi ground troops and U.S. advisers to 
engage this terrorist organization’s fighters. ISIL’s use of these UAVs as delivery 
vehicles for explosives was a clear violation of the Laws of War because they did not 
distinguish between inhabited and uninhabited houses and compounds.202 
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Even after retaking these houses and major areas of the city, the sewage system 
and an additional man-made tunnel system increased the level of difficulty for retaking 
Mosul.203 As could be seen in the case study on Operation Protective Edge, tunnel 
systems are notoriously dangerous for warfighters who are exposed to a place on the 
battlefield that they cannot navigate in the same way as streets or even houses. These 
locations enhanced ISIL’s defensive positions.204 Overall, this factor complicates the 
retaking of cities on the tactical level as a whole. While no official decision was made at 
the time, evidence suggests that help from U.S. advisers helped turn the battle in the favor 
of the Iraqi Security Forces. 
Using deeper embedding with their Iraqi partners, US Special Forces were able to 
aid in fighting ISIL in the tunnel and sewage systems of Mosul.205 This decision is an 
example of combat commanders and their troops adapting to the conditions of the 
battlefield while keeping within the bounds of the ROE. It also demonstrates how 
policymakers have a direct effect on the battlefield through shaping the policy that 
informs the formulation of the ROE.  
The complexity of this fight highlights the importance of ground combat troops. 
While air power could provide support at critical points in this battle, the majority of the 
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fighting was being done by infantry units. Furthermore, this urban battlefield 
demonstrates how the conditions of the operating environment affect the duration of a 
mission. 
Having examined the battlefield conditions, we now turn to examining the factors 
that led to success in the battle for eastern Mosul.   
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Chapter 4 Conclusion 
 
 Eastern Mosul was retaken after 100 days of very physically taxing and brutal 
close quarters battles (CQB) throughout the city.206  
 The fight for the eastern part of Mosul shows several important lessons related to 
this thesis. Clear policy goals and a well-formulated strategy allow commanders and 
warfighters on the ground to use the tactical means at their disposal to achieve strategic 
objectives and policy goals. 
 The fight for eastern Mosul was only one part of the counter-ISIL strategy. Albeit 
being waged successfully, this fight highlights the return of primitive modes of fighting 
to the modern battlefield. The urban combat conducted by the ISF and embedded US 
Special Forces only demonstrates that gruesome close quarters fighting tactics and 
techniques can decide the outcome of battles in urban areas. Whoever is better at CQB is 
more likely to win an urban warfare engagement. While the 21st century is supposed to 
bring about many miraculous technological developments, urban warfare only throws us 
back to modes of fighting that are as primitive as they were back in Sun Tzu’s time. A 
democracy can be successful only if it has the political will to engage in the brutal 
fighting that ensues during urban warfare.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
a. Conclusion 
 
Urbanization calls for a reexamination of warfare. Precisely because urbanization 
influences social interactions, it transforms the political context and the urban operating 
environment. Hence, urban combat should be subjected to more rigorous study than it has 
over the past three decades. The classical texts in military history have been revisited in 
this thesis to place the importance of urban combat into a factual context:  over the past 
thousand years, we did not fight in cities. 
Urban combat has had a special, confined place in warfighting and military 
studies. The more recent fights for cities such as Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, Basra and 
the terror attacks in Orlando/ Florida, Paris/ France, Brussels/ Belgium, and the IDF’s 
past operations in Gaza are evidence for the growing importance of understanding the 
strategic implications of tactical level engagements (CQB) in urban areas. CQB tactics 
have been the driving force for victories on urban battlefields. With the rise in 
urbanization, cities around the world are going to be the drivers of economic growth and 
will contain the potential security hazards. While the areas of conflict resolution, social 
projects, and de-escalation measures have received a fair amount of academic attention 
from researchers, there has not been a discussion on the necessity of which tactics to 
employ when urban combat engagements are fought.  
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Policy goals require ways of warfare. For this, one needs to understand the 
different ways of warfare and the tactics associated with them. As could be seen in 
chapter 1, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are the two most prominent thinkers on these topics. 
A strategy is drawn up to guide decision-makers in achieving goals set out in a policy. 
Strategic objectives are how a policy is administered; operations are how to go about 
achieving those goals; and tactics are the tools that can be used to conduct these 
operations. Dominating an enemy in engagements is central to defeating non-state actors 
and countering the spread of these groups’ ideologies.  
Especially in urban warfare, non-state actors use asymmetric tactics to fight 
government and stabilization forces. While technology is a dominant factor in combat, 
force employment is more important.207 As technological advances in Western 
governments have led to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW), the use of Effects Based Operations (EBO), and the development of Air 
Land Battle Doctrine (ALB), potential adversaries have developed the Other Revolution 
in Military Affairs (O – RMA).208 Apart from O – RMA, all the other terms above rely on 
technological dominance. As could be seen throughout this thesis, however, 
technological superiority does not necessarily help in urban warfare. Yet, technology is 
one factor affecting the conduct of modern wars. To successfully engage in urban 
combat, tactical abilities need to be emphasized. Policymakers must understand this.  
                                                
207 For an excellent discussion of force employment as the dominant factor for achieving victory in 
military engagements, see Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern 
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To conduct strategy successfully, operations plans must be drawn up and 
implemented. Strategy should be considered a framework for the actions that will be 
undertaken to achieve the goals defined by policy. Rather than adjusting one’s strategy, 
one should adapt the means, operational concepts, and the tactics that can be employed 
when conducting operations to achieve strategic goals. The ability to conduct urban 
combat operations contributes to achieving strategic objectives and policy goals 
successfully.   
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b. Recommendations – Topics to focus on in the Future 
 
Tactics are important for reaching policy goals. As the case studies in this thesis 
demonstrate, the tactical nature of complex urban operations environments requires more 
understanding of the diverse tactics necessary for every warfighter to operate successfully 
in an urban environment. The tactical toolkit is essential and cannot be substituted 
through strategizing. Furthermore, being politically opposed to the use of force will not 
solve the problems surrounding urban conflict and combat. Understanding how to 
balance the use of CQB tactics with COIN (counterinsurgency), OOTW (operations other 
than war), and humanitarian assistance inspired tactics is what is needed in the future. 
Every warfighter is important in an operating environment as complex as the 
urban and peri-urban space. We must focus on the skills of the single warfighter. The 
tactics used by warfighters as single actors and in teams are what drives the innovation of 
technology, equipment, and operational concepts and plans. These factors contribute to 
successfully attaining policy goals.  
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c. Recommendations for Future Actions 
 
The death of children, and the destruction of private property and buildings of 
importance to the communities in which the operations are conducted, will only 
negatively affect the outcome of military operations. Therefore, high moral standards 
should be integrated into the training of all military personnel. Regardless of whether 
officers have direct orders or have to stick to operational procedures when conducting 
urban operations, one must at times act as one deems fit and also in accordance with the 
outlines of manuals.  
It would help to inform policymakers about the difficulties concerning urban 
operations. Explaining the conceptual context of urban combat to them would improve 
their understanding of the urban operating environment. Thus, the conceptual difficulties 
of formulating a strategy that requires a diverse range of tactics can be approached with 
better-informed decision-makers. 
 In regard to the application of urban warfare tactics, we must accept that there are 
no easy tactical answers to this strategic issue. Urban combat is messy and requires 
political and military leaders to accept that while Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) are important on the urban battlefield, 
tactical innovation cannot be forgotten. Urban warfare, unlike maneuver warfare in deep 
operating environments, is subject to an abnormal amount of chaos and uncertainty. In 
relation to future urban combat, the most important SOP will be tactical innovation.  
With an increase in the number of megacities around the world, these will be the 
battlefields of the future. With the willingness to commit resources, operational planning 
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for combat in urban environments can become part of the executable contingency 
operations that Armed Forces can conduct when necessary. 
The ways to fight in an environment as complex as the urban area need to be 
studied, so that the means to engage in urban warfare are better understood. As it stands, 
urban operations are without doubt very difficult to plan and execute. By studying how to 
improve the warfighter’s combat capabilities, the strategic engagement options available 
to national security policymakers should be increased. A well-trained military able of 
fighting in urban areas and delivering victory is necessary as the security risks in cities 
around the world accumulate.  
Furthermore, the future of international terrorism will be heavily influenced by the 
increased rate of urbanization. Kilcullen explains that the way in which terrorism is going 
to be conducted will be heavily linked to the internet and the global information 
infrastructure.209 As a result, we must look back at how terrorism around the world 
developed, and which measures have been used in the past to counter terrorist 
organizations. From countering violent extremism, over using Special Forces units to 
conduct search & seizure operations, to freezing financial assets and confiscating tangible 
assets, the tactics used by counter-terrorists must be embedded in a wide array of 
operations. The history of international terrorism and counterterrorism methods clearly 
shows us that there cannot be a “one size fits all” approach to respond to or preempt 
terrorist activities. 
                                                
209 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 35-40. 
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The military must find a way to bring these ideas to fruition and decrease the 
amount of difficulties the soldier faced in the two case studies discussed in this thesis. 
Having clear strategic goals is absolutely necessary, but the urban operating environment 
is so complex that tactics will remain the dominant factor. Only a wide ranging tactical 
toolkit can be employed successfully in urban combat to fight and win battles and 
campaigns. This will ultimately contribute to the success of a policy.   
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